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ABSTRACT
The world today is afflicted by inequality of wealth created in
large part by monopolistic ownership of land. Hong Kong, with the
least affordable housing in the world, provides a particularly apt
example of how property law protects such monopolies—and also
how the creation of new property rights can break them up.
In this Article we use Hong Kong as a case study to suggest both
a diagnosis and a solution to two aspects of property law that slow
down the creation of housing. First, the division of property rights
between private owners and the government creates a bilateral
monopoly that results in gridlock. Second, reallocating property
rights to end such gridlock is impeded by the reciprocal causation
between property rights and political influence—what we will call a
“constituency effect” of property law. Rather than attempt a frontal
assault on existing holdings that would likely be foiled by such
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constituency effects, we suggest that the government should create
entirely new property rights around which new interest groups
could form. By giving every Hong Kong resident “land options for
housing” (LOHs), the government could create a competitive
market for development rights that simultaneously ends the
gridlock of monopoly and creates a new constituency to lobby for
more housing. Under our proposal, property owners would
compete with each other to purchase LOHs from LOH holders in
order to build high-density housing. Such a system would
simultaneously give the LOH holders a stake in moving land from
low-value to high-value uses while providing ample compensation
to existing stakeholders.
The problem posed by Hong Kong’s mix of bilateral monopoly
and constituency effects transcends Hong Kong. We also examine
how these connected obstacles to housing construction can defeat or
be defeated by land options in places ranging from Israel to New
York City. There is a larger lesson for property theory at stake in the
interaction of bilateral monopolies with constituency effects. The
sense of entitlement generated by existing property rights limits
politicians’ ability to design new, more flexible forms of property.
There are, in other words, transaction costs generated by property
that impede not only economic but also political transactions.
Overcoming those transaction costs requires legislative proposals
that create new constituencies but are not yet blocked by the old
constituencies that the existing property regime promotes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The world today is afflicted by inequality of wealth created in
large part by monopolistic ownership of land. Thomas Piketty has
famously shown how returns to capital have outstripped returns to
labor.1 The share of wealth accruing to the owners of land turns out
to be at least as great an engine of inequality as ownership of finance
capital. 2 The returns to land are driven by the unique value of
parcels in cities where labor is most productive. Individuals and
enterprises frequently depend on proximity to each other for their
productivity. 3 Gains in productivity from such proximity—what
economists call “agglomeration economies”—are huge. 4 Because
there is a fixed supply of parcels in cities with large agglomeration
economies, landowners in such cities can levy immense tolls on
everyone else by charging extraordinary premiums to buy or rent
real estate.5 Across the globe, in cities like Rio de Janeiro,6 Yangon,7

1 See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur
Goldhammer, trans., 2017 ed. 2013) (discussing wealth and income inequality in
Europe and the United States).
2
See Matt Rognlie, Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital Share:
Accumulation or Scarcity?, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2015, at 51.
3 See, e.g., AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS (Edward Glaeser ed., 2010) (examining
the reasons why economic activity continues to cluster together despite the falling
costs of moving goods and transmitting information).
4 See David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation,
127 YALE L.J. 78, 96 (2017) (explaining that, according to agglomeration economics,
“location matters. When people and capital congregate in particular cities and
regions, they learn and trade more easily, and this creates wealth and generates
economic growth”).
5 See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable
City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 115-16 (2015) (arguing that binding and comprehensive
urban planning, one of the most criticized ideas in land-use law, could be part of an
antidote for regulatory barriers strangling our housing supply).
6
See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY xiii-xiv (2018).
7
See Khine Yin Htun, Yangon’s Housing Inequality During the Covid-19
Pandemic,
TEA
CIRCLE
(Jan.
13,
2021),
https://teacircleoxford.com/2021/01/13/yangons-housing-inequality-duringthe-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/WA35-BTWY].
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Johannesburg, 8 and London, 9 landowners are reaping rents from
their monopolistic position, creating a shortage of housing that
divides residents between housing haves and have-nots.10
In this Article we use Hong Kong as a case study to suggest both
a diagnosis and a solution to the problem of inequality driven by
monopolistic property rights. Among cities dominated by real estate
oligarchy, Hong Kong is a special case. Its housing market has been
the least affordable in the world for a decade, easily beating out
London and San Francisco for this dubious distinction. 11 Yet this
housing crisis is a paradox of housing scarcity amidst plenty of land.
Only about 24% of Hong Kong’s land is built up, with the balance
currently occupied by woodland, shrubland, and grassland. 12
Moreover, that 24% of built-up land includes warehouses and
industrial facilities that are manifestly less urgently needed than
more housing: 1,414 hectares (5.46 square miles) consist of
brownfield sites containing old industrial facilities. 13 Despite this
abundance of buildable land, Hong Kong’s population is crammed
into apartments with an “average living area per person of about 215
square feet—much less than in New York City, Shanghai, or nearby
Shenzhen”—and “[t]he waitlist for public housing is on average 5.7
years.”14 Unsurprisingly, Beijing-affiliated pundits have touted the
8 See John Campbell, Affordable Housing Crisis in Johannesburg, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 6, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/affordablehousing-crisis-johannesburg
[https://perma.cc/ME8B-AWYN];
Lerato
Mogoatlhe, The City of Johannesburg Is Turning 37 Factories into 3,000 Homes, GLOB.
CITIZEN (July 2, 2019), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/johannesburgold-factories-into-homes-housing [https://perma.cc/3KW7-E8PT].
9 See Mark Townsend & Liam Kelly, Thousands Gather in London to Protest
Against Lack of Affordable Housing, GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2015, 12:43 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jan/31/hundreds-gather-londonmarch-for-homes-protest-city-hall-affordable-housing [https://perma.cc/F2QTWKRB].
10
Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV.,
467, 475-76 (2018).
11 See Shawna Kwan, Hong Kong Homes Ranked Least Affordable for 11th Year,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
22,
2021,
10:49
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-23/hong-kong-homesranked-world-s-least-affordable-for-11th-year [https://perma.cc/K5ZX-UHLW].
12 Land Utilization in Hong Kong, PLAN. DEP’T, H.K. OFF. GOV’T CHIEF INFO.
OFFICER
(July
31,
2019),
https://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/info_serv/statistic/landu.html
[https://perma.cc/AC9E-2DN2].
13 See id.
14 See Shitong Qiao & Roderick M. Hills Jr., Development Rights for All, 1 USALI
PERSPS., June 17, 2021.
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idea of a communist-style land reform as a solution to the most
severe housing crisis in the world and the deep social inequality and
division caused by that crisis.15
We offer a different solution based on our diagnosis of the
problem as rooted in two familiar aspects of property law theory.
First, Hong Kong’s division of property rights between private
owners and the government creates a bilateral monopoly that results
in gridlock—that is, a kind of anti-commons in which an asset lies
unused because each side enjoys a veto over its development. 16
Second, reallocating property rights to end such gridlock can be
impeded by the reciprocal causation between property rights and
political influence—what we will call a “constituency effect” of
property law. Property rights create a focal point around which
owners can rally, reducing their costs of political organization and
thereby enabling them to resist changes in the property status quo.
Governmental officials armed with apparently sweeping legal
powers can be practically stymied by such constituency effects. In
Hong Kong, for instance, villagers, tycoons, and activists, provoked
by their sense of entitlement to the status quo, engage in vigorous
and effective litigation and lobbying to block any political change to
existing property entitlements.17
Hong Kong’s housing crisis seems to emerge from this
combination of anti-commons gridlock and entitlement-protecting
constituency effects. Current entitlement-holders—developers,
indigenous villagers, land justice activists, and the government
itself—have for decades been locked in apparently endless dickering
over how to divide the gains from converting land from low-value
uses like warehouses and small homes to higher-value uses like
residential high-rises. 18 Meanwhile, the beneficiaries of more
housing—potential buyers and renters currently crammed in undersized apartments—are politically disorganized, scattered across the
entire jurisdiction without any networks to overcome collective
15 See Keith Zhai & Chun Han Wong, China Targets Hong Kong Wealth Gap,
Housing Woes After Political Purge, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2021, 9:07 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-targets-hong-kong-wealth-gap-housingwoes-after-political-purge-11615813651 [https://perma.cc/KA9C-N2UA].
16
For an overview of the concept as an “anti-commons” as property that is
under-developed as a result of having too many owners with veto rights over its
development, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 621-88 (1998).
17 See infra Part III.
18 See Qiao & Hills, supra note 14.
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action problems or the focused incentives in any particular housing
project to exert themselves to lobby for new construction.19
What can be done to break the deadlock? Rather than attempt a
frontal assault on the property rights of real estate tycoons and
indigenous villagers, we suggest that the government would be
better advised to create entirely new property rights around which
new interest groups could form. Those new groups could break the
bilateral monopoly of officials’ dickering with current owners over
the development of specific parcels. Specifically, we propose to give
every Hong Kong resident “land options for housing” (LOHs). In
such a regime, LOH holders, rather than the government itself,
would sell these LOHs to developers and indigenous villagers.
Those buyers would compete with each other to purchase LOHs in
order to build high-density housing, simultaneously giving the
LOH holders a stake in moving land from low-value to high-value
uses while providing ample compensation to existing
stakeholders.20
The problem posed by Hong Hong’s mix of bilateral monopoly
and constituency effects transcends Hong Kong. It is a problem
vexing both housing markets and property theory alike. Cities
around the world are struggling to find ways to unlock urban real
estate’s development with innovative property rights.21 Done badly,
however, such property tends to be locked in place by the sense of
entitlement created by the legal status quo.22 Fancy auctions, selfvaluation for both tax and eminent domain, and complex liability
rules are impressive but useless academic exercises unless one can
figure out how to overcome the organizational advantages
conferred on the constituents who benefit from the property rights
that such rules seek to change. Bilateral monopoly and constituency
effects are, in sum, two equations with two unknown variables that
must be solved simultaneously.
Hong Kong’s housing crisis illustrates this reciprocal causation
between property law and public ordering. Our proposal to allocate
See infra Section III.b.ii.
Our proposal bears a resemblance to Salim Furth’s proposal to overcome
resistance to new housing with “development dividends,” an entitlement to a share
of the gains from new development rights to a jurisdiction’s renters. See SALIM
FURTH, DEVELOPMENT DIVIDENDS: SHARING EQUITY TO OVERCOME OPPOSITION TO
HOUSING 3-6 (2019). Like Furth’s development dividends, our LOHs are designed
to create a pro-housing constituency. Unlike Furth’s proposal however, our LOHs
are also adapted to deal with the problem of bilateral monopoly.
21 See infra Part V.
22 See infra Part III.
19
20
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the vertical dimension of property to LOH holders illustrates one
such possible solution. By requiring current property owners to bid
against each other for the purchase of LOHs, our proposal would
simultaneously create a new interest group and eliminate the
bilateral monopoly that has stymied land development in Hong
Kong. The lessons of LOHs, however, can be extended beyond Hong
Kong to any jurisdiction where the influence of existing
rightsholders impedes the transfer of an asset to its most valued use.
There is also a larger lesson for property theory at stake in the
interaction of bilateral monopolies with constituency effects.
Bilateral monopolies are often the product of valuable entitlements
that powerfully mobilize constituencies in their defense.
“Homevoters,” for instance, dominate zoning processes23 in much
the same way that developers and indigenous villagers dominate
buildable land in Hong Kong.24 The political influence generated by
these entitlements prevents politicians from simply reshuffling the
deck of private-law property allocations and starting anew because
those very allocations define who will effectively lobby, elect, or
inform those politicians. 25 Property theory, therefore, needs to
integrate institutional politics into its theory of entitlements.
Treating the political process or legislative politics as a deus ex
machina that can step in to redress the limits of private law ignores
the ways that private law limits the political process.26
As economist Daren Acemoglu noted almost two decades ago,
we need a political Coase theorem to define and overcome the
transaction costs that block political reassignments of property
rights.27 The sense of entitlement that existing entitlements generate
limits the ability of politicians to design new and more flexible forms
of property.28 There are, in other words, transaction costs generated
by property that impede not only economic but also political

23
Hills & Schleicher, supra note 5, at 107; David Schleicher, City
Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1683 (2013); Pritchett & Qiao, supra note 10.
24 See infra Part II.
25
On the need for property law scholarship to take into account the
constituency effects of real property rather than assuming that legislatures can reallocate property rights with a free hand, see Roderick Hills & David Schleicher,
Building Coalitions Out of Thin Air: Transferable Development Rights and “Constituency
Effects” in Land Use Law, 12 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 79 (2020).
26 Id.
27
Daren Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict,
Commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595, 620 (2003).
28
Hills & Schleicher, supra note 25.
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transactions. 29 Overcoming those transaction costs requires
legislative proposals that create new constituencies but are not
blocked by the old ones.30
The roadmap for our argument starts with a description of Hong
Kong’s housing crisis in Part II. In Part III, we diagnose this crisis’s
causes in the structure of property law, first by setting out the
general theory that links property rights to negotiation-stalling
bilateral monopoly in Section III.a, and second, by showing in
Section III.b how constituency effects of property defeat some
familiar solutions to such monopolies—for instance, liability rules of
various stripes, auctions, and self-valuation. In Part IV, we lay out
our solution to this gridlock: LOHs, the purchase of which is both
necessary and sufficient for the development of high-density
residential structures. We will explain how LOHs simultaneously
create a constituency for residential development, promote interparcel competition, and let bidding guided by self-interested
predictions of landowners determine the location of housing. Part V
concludes with some lessons for property monopolies in other
settings, such as zoning in American cities.
II. THE LANDSCAPE OF THE PROBLEM: HOW PROPERTY LAW HAS
FAILED TO CREATE HOUSING IN HONG KONG
Before plunging into any diagnosis, we begin with a description
of Hong Kong’s housing problem. For decades, Hong Kong’s
government has acknowledged the undeniable fact that Hong
Kong’s citizens suffer from a debilitating shortage of housing. 31
Despite numerous efforts to solve the problem, however, land
remains locked up in brownfields, small three-story residential
structures, and empty grassland and forest, a small fraction of which
would suffice to build all of the housing the Hong Kong’s residents
need.32

See infra Part III.
See infra Section IV.b.
31 See Zhou Wenmin & Wang Duan, What’s Stopping Hong Kong from Fixing Its
Housing Crisis?, THINKCHINA (July 9, 2021), https://www.thinkchina.sg/whatsstopping-hong-kong-fixing-its-housing-crisis
[https://perma.cc/F8DJ-9WYJ]
(“Improving housing affordability has been the top concern of every Hong Kong
government.”).
32 See infra Sections II.a, II.b, and II.c.
29
30

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/5

2022

Land Options for Housing

173

a. How Land in Hong Kong Is Used
The paradox of Hong Kong’s housing shortage is epitomized by
the absence of housing in an abundance of buildable land. The total
land area in Hong Kong is approximately 1,111 square kilometers. 33
Within that total land area, only approximately 24% is built-up area,
while the remaining 76% is non-built-up area, mostly consisting of
woodland, shrubland, grassland, or wetland, including many
country parks. 34 Only 3.8% is devoted to any sort of non-rural
residential uses: 2.3% is private residential land, while 1.5% is public
residential land.35 By contrast, 3.2% is rural settlement or “villagetype development land,”36 including the so-called small-house and
Tso/Tong land ( 祖 堂地 ), also known as ancestral land; 1.5% is
warehouse and open storage, mainly classified as “brownfields;”
4.5% is agricultural land, most of which is unfarmed and of which
developers own a big portion.37 In sum, more than twice as much
land in Hong Kong is devoted to warehouses, crops, and small
village houses as higher-density residential uses.
b. How Land in Hong Kong Is Owned
Under the system of public land ownership inherited from the
British colonial period, the Hong Kong government provides for
private control of real estate by leasing land to private lessors,
usually for a period of ninety-nine years.38 While the government

33
TASK FORCE ON LAND SUPPLY, H.K. DEV. BUREAU, PAPER NO. 02/2017,
DEMAND FOR LAND ¶ 2 (2017); Hong Kong - the Facts, GOVHK (May 2021),
https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/facts.htm [https://perma.cc/U3MLW4Z8].
34
TASK FORCE ON LAND SUPPLY, supra note 33, ¶ 2.
35 See Land Utilization in Hong Kong, supra note 12.
36
Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., LCQ18: Village Type Development Zone (Oct.
30,
2013),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201310/30/P201310300373_print.htm
[https://perma.cc/N5GT-C2FW].
37 Id.
38 Land Tenure System and Land Policy in Hong Kong, LANDS DEP’T, GOV’T OF
H.K. (2017), https://www.landsd.gov.hk/en/resources/land-info-stat/landtenure-system-land-policy.html [https://perma.cc/NE7P-ELS4]; Edmond Chan &
Shiu Man Wan, Global Corporate Real Estate Guide: Hong Kong, BAKER MCKENZIE,
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reserves the right to “resume” the lease on payment of just
compensation for the balance of the lease’s term, 39 these leases
operate much like any fee simple absolute: They are traded on the
secondary market just like any other private property and are the
basis for the lessors’ investment in improvements. 40 Accordingly,
we shall refer to such lessors as “lessee-owners” and long-term
leases from the government to such owners as “ownership” for the
sake of convenience and clarity.
In this system of quasi-private ownership, the vast majority of
land suitable for new residential construction is held by private
lessee-owners. 41 Such lands include agricultural and brownfield
lands, primarily held by land development companies, and “villagetype development land” held by indigenous villagers either as
households or village associations or reserved by the government
for indigenous villagers’ future uses.42
i. Agricultural Land and Brownfields
“Agricultural land” is a misnomer, describing the zoning rather
than the use of the real estate: Of the 4,400 hectares (ha) of
“agricultural land” in Hong Kong, only about 700 ha are actively
farmed. 43 Whether farmed or fallow, over 80% of this land is in
private hands. 44 The four biggest developers in Hong Kong own
around 930 ha or 21% of this agricultural land reserve. 45 Because
https://resourcehub.bakermckenzie.com/en/resources/global-corporate-realestate-guide/asia-pacific/hong-kong/topics/real-estate-law
[https://perma.cc/ZZS8-CHUU].
39 See Chan & Wan, supra note 38.
40 Land Tenure System and Land Policy in Hong Kong, supra note 38.
41 See, e.g., ROGER NISSIM AND JOHN CORRIGALL, LAND SUPPLY - WHY AND HOW
WE NEED TO UNLOCK THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S LAND BANKS TO HELP MEET CURRENT
HOUSING
NEED
(2016),
https://www.reda.hk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Lease-modifications-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3JBT-AMRV].
42 See supra Section II.a.
43
Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., LCQ18: Statistics on Agricultural Lands and
Development
Plans
(June
28,
2017),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201706/28/P2017062800606.htm
[https://perma.cc/6RQL-V2RP].
44 Land Utilization in Hong Kong, supra note 12, at 56.
45
Lin Yueqian (林樂謙), Mei Iin: Si Da Di Chan Shang Yong Yu Yi Fang Chi
Nong Di Heng Di Zhan Jin Ban (美銀﹕四大地產商擁逾億方呎農地 恒地佔近半)
[Meiyin: Four Biggest Developers Own Agricultural Land of More Than 100 Million
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developers are interested in real estate development, they generally
let such land lie fallow, having purchased it at a low price reflecting
its low value for agriculture in hopes of eventually rezoning the land
for more valuable uses.46
For the same motivation, developers also hold significant
amounts of brownfields. 47 There are about 1,600 hectares of
brownfields, more than 80% of which are privately owned, mainly
by the major developers.48 “Brownfield” is an imported term from
the United Kingdom and the United States and generally refers to
agricultural land in the New Territories which has been converted
to low-cost uses since the decline of agricultural activities.49 Current
uses include port back-up uses, open storage, logistics operations,
vehicle parking, vehicle repair workshops, recycling yards, rural
workshops, and construction machinery and materials storage. 50
These lands occupy relatively flat areas in the New Territories and
are often intermingled with villages, squatter structures, and active
or fallow farmland.51

Square Feet, Nearly a Half Belonging to Henderson Land], HK01 (Sept. 25, 2019,
7:38 PM), https://www.hk01.com/地產樓市/375584/收回土地條例-美銀-四大地產
商擁逾億方呎農地-恒地佔近半 [https://perma.cc/Q74R-5DU9].
46 See e.g., Ping Lun Bian Ji Shi (評論編輯室), Fazhanshang Tunji Nongdi Guo
Qiangongqin Tudi Kongzhishui Shi Jiejue Liangfang M? (發展商囤積農地過千公頃
土地空置稅是解決良方嗎？) [Developers Have Hoarded Over 1,000 Hectares of
Agricultural Land: Would a Land Vacancy Tax Be a Good Solution?], HK01
https://www.hk01.com/01 觀點/308785/發展商囤積農地過千公頃-土地空置稅是
解決良方嗎 [https://perma.cc/LJE9-5WLN].
47 See Ming Jian Lian Mi Shu Zhang (民建聯秘書長), Fa Zhan Zong Di Xu Fang
Ming YI Di Chan Shang (發展棕地須防明益地產商) [Development of Brownfields
Requires Attention to Profiting Property Developers], Ta Kung Pao (大公報) [TA
KUNG
NEWSPAPER]
(Jan.
12,
2019,
3:17
AM),
http://www.takungpao.com.hk/opinion/233119/2019/0112/233073.html
[https://perma.cc/8Z5M-MV6V].
48 Land Utilization in Hong Kong, supra note 12, at 22, 56.
49
He Wei Zong Di (何謂棕地?) [What is Brownfield?], Xianggang Jingli Ribao
( 香 港 經 濟 日 報 ) [H.K. ECON. TIMES] (Aug. 8, 2018, 8:15 PM),
https://service.hket.com/knowledge/2133284/
何
謂
棕
地
?
[https://perma.cc/VWJ3-266P].
50 Id.
51
TASK FORCE ON LAND SUPPLY, H.K. DEV. BUREAU, PAPER NO. 05/2017,
BROWNFIELD SITES ¶ 3 (2017).
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ii. Indigenous Villagers’ Rights to Small Houses and Village-Type
Development Land
Roughly 3,380 hectares of land is zoned as “village-type
development land” and held for the current or eventual use by
indigenous villagers, either as low-density small-property houses,
ancestral temples, or vacant land on which small-property houses
will eventually be built.52
In 1972, the colonial government created a “small house policy”
(SHP) modelled on Qing law.53 Under the SHP, a male indigenous
villager (“ding”) aged eighteen years old or older who is descended
through the male line from a resident in 1898 of a recognized village
in New Territories may apply to the Lands Department of the Hong
Kong government for permission to build for himself a small house.
Such a small house is a residential structure no higher than three
stories with each floor limited to 700 square feet built on a suitable
site within the applicant’s own village once during his lifetime. 54
After the 1997 turnover, such rights to small houses, or ding rights,
are protected as indigenous villagers’ “traditional rights” under
Article 40 of the Hong Kong Basic Law.55 To be clear, the Hong Kong
Basic Law has not mentioned SHP and there have been critiques of
SHP and challenges in courts.56 Nevertheless, in 2021, the Court of
Final Appeals of Hong Kong SAR decided that “Ding rights were,
on a proper construction of BL40, within the NTIIs’ lawful and
traditional rights and interests covered by that article and were,

52 See Jeanie Chan, RICS Calls on Hong Kong Government to Invest More Resources
to Increase Land Supply, RICS (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.rics.org/en-hk/newsinsight/latest-news/press/press-releases/land-supply-hong-kong-government
[https://perma.cc/665Y-GNX6].
53 See LISA HOPKINSON & MANDY LAO MAN LEI, RETHINKING THE SMALL HOUSE
POLICY 31 (2003).
54
TASK FORCE ON LAND SUPPLY, H.K. DEV. BUREAU, PAPER NO. 14/2017,
VILLAGE TYPE DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW TERRITORIES ¶ 2 (2017).
55
”The lawful traditional rights and interests of the indigenous inhabitants of
the “New Territories” shall be protected by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.” XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 40 (H.K.).
56
Jasmine Siu, Controversial small-house policy is constitutional only on private
land, Hong Kong High Court rules in landmark hearing, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr.
8, 2019, 11:19 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-andcrime/article/3005094/controversial-small-house-policy-constitutional
[https://perma.cc/A3ME-UYD7].
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despite their inherently discriminatory nature, entitled to
constitutional protection in full.”57
In most cases, the eligible villager builds a small house merely
by applying for a building license to construct a structure on the
villager’s own land. But villagers also have the right to build a house
on government-owned land in exchange for the villager’s property
or, if the villager is landless, apply for a Private Treaty Grant on
government land purchasable at two-thirds of the land’s market
value.58 In today’s Hong Kong, the government has reserved 932.9
ha of “village type development land” to satisfy future claims by
indigenous villagers’ to their “small house”, or ding, rights.59 Such
reserved land has been left vacant for future claims.
c. How Hong Kong Land Is (Not) Developed: The Failure of Lease
Modifications and Land Resumption
With the above 9,380 hectares of land sitting semi-idle, Hong
Kong has no shortage of land on which high-density residential
building could easily be constructed. It is estimated that the 932
hectares of “village-type development land” currently reserved by
the government alone could supply up to 500,000 housing units if
ten-floor buildings (rather than the current 3-floor buildings) were
permitted on them.60 Moreover, the current occupants of this land
are neither satisfied with the status quo nor resistant to their land’s
Kwok Cheuk Kin v. Dir. Lands, [2021] H.K.C.F.A. 38.
See Cheng Xue (程雪), Dingquanan Shangsuting Caijue Dingwu Bu Weixian
Dan Nengfou Hushi San Da Biduan? (丁權案 | 上訴庭裁決丁屋不違憲 但能否忽視
三大弊端?) [The New Territories Rights Case | The Court of Appeals Ruled New
Territories Rights Constitutional, but Could the Three Main Drawbacks Be
Ignored?], HK01 (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.hk01.com/周報/578941/丁權案-上
訴庭裁決丁屋不違憲-但能否忽視三大弊端 [https://perma.cc/52CP-M5EP].
59
Ping Lun Bian Ji Shi (評論編輯室) [Staff Editor’s Office], Shifang Tudi Zuo
Fangwu Guihua Keburonghuan Zhengfu Zhongxu Miandui Dingquan Wenti (釋
放土地作房屋規劃刻不容緩 政府終須面對「丁權」問題) [Release of Land for
Housing Planning Is Urgent and the Government Will Sooner or Later Face the
Problem
of
Ding
Rights],
HK01
(Feb.
21,
2019,
7:19
PM),
https://www.hk01.com/01 觀點/297875/釋放土地作房屋規劃刻不容緩-政府終須
面對-丁權-問題 [https://perma.cc/L5ER-JPL5].
60
Tuantichang Dingwu Fangkuan Jianshiceng ( 團 體 倡 丁 屋 放 寬 建 十 層 )
[Groups Advocate the Relaxation of the Building of Ten-Storey Small House],
Dongfang Ribao ( 東 方 日 報 ) [ORIENTAL DAILY] (May 19, 2014),
https://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20140519/mobile/odn-201405190519_00176_028.html [https://perma.cc/77TH-BREB].
57

58
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conversion to high-density residential uses. Indigenous villagers in
particular seem utterly dissatisfied with their “small house”
entitlement that is ostensibly designed for their benefit. Heung Yee
Kuk, the organization that represents the indigenous inhabitants’
view, supports high-rise development by using the public-private
partnership model. 61 The “Kuk’s” view is reenforced by a 2014
survey showing that 88% of the indigenous inhabitants agreed that
three-floor small houses were a huge waste of land and supported
the development of high-rises.62
How, then, is it possible that the land has not been converted
from current uses that none of the land’s current users want? As
explained below, the government and these users cannot reach an
agreement on the premium that should be charged to the lessees for
conversion from low- to higher-value uses. Dickering over this
premium has stalled this conversion for decades. In theory, the
government could either resume leases after paying just
compensation to the lessees or accede to the villagers’ and
developers’ view of a proper premium. But the former option is
foreclosed by the government’s lack of information, and the latter
option is foreclosed by politics. Lease resumption is a slow process
made intractable by the predictably persistent litigation of
developers with the best knowledge of the land’s actual value. As
for giving into villagers and developers, the government is under
pressure from “land justice” activists and mortgage holders not to
confer windfalls on groups regarded as excessively privileged by
many in Hong Kong. 63 In contrast with the robust activism to
prevent windfalls for villagers and developers, there are few
protests seeking to increase the supply of housing. The underhoused are simply missing from the public housing discussion
despite hundreds of thousands of under-housed Hong Kong
61
Dingquan Shangsuan Xiangyiju Liuyeqiang Xiongrong Quansheng Yi
Zhengfu Jingkuai Chuli Jiya Shenqing (丁權上訴案 鄉議局劉業強形容全勝 冀政府
盡快處理積壓丁屋申請) [New Territories Appeals Case: Liu Yeqiang from Heung
Yee Kuk Described as Full Victory, Hoping that Government Soon Deal with the
Backlog of New Territories Applications], ORANGE NEWS (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.orangenews.hk/hongkong/147930/【丁權上訴案】鄉議局劉業強
形容全勝-冀政府盡快處理積壓丁屋申請.jhtml [https://perma.cc/ZP6F-4PZF].
62
Groups Advocate the Relaxation of the Building of Ten-Storey Small House,
supra note 60.
63 See e.g., Peace Chiu, Protesters Storm Elite Hong Kong Golf Course, Call for Land
to Be Used for Homes, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 31, 2018, 6:52 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/community/article/2139769/protesters-storm-elite-hong-kong-golf-coursecall-land-be [https://perma.cc/6MJ2-BKHZ].
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residents who are now crammed into tiny apartments rented at
exorbitant prices.64
i.

Rezoning and Lease Modification: Endless Haggling Over the
Gains from Land Conversion

Because Hong Kong’s system of property rests on the
government’s leasing Crown lands to private lessees, any
conversion of land from its current uses to high-density residential
purposes requires both a regulatory change and a lease
modification. The first step requires lessee-owners to apply to the
Town Planning Board for a plan amendment—basically, a
modification of the land’s zoning.65 The second step requires those
owners to apply to the Lands Department for a lease modification.66
Because the government has a duty to obtain a fair stream of revenue
from any lease modification, the second stage requires the
government to negotiate a “premium” from the lessee-owner in
exchange for the increase in value conferred by broadening the
range of permissible uses under the lease.67
Neither of these two stages is easy, but negotiations over that
lease premium have been the primary cause of delay in conversion
of land.68 Regulatory change by itself is also time consuming as a
64 See e.g., Nikki Natividad, What Can be Done About Hong Kong’s Ridiculously
Tiny
Flats?,
VICE
(Mar.
30,
2021),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7m5md/hong-kong-housing-smallsubdivided-apartments [https://perma.cc/Q9SK-87DB] (“A subdivided flat can
range from 18 to 160 square feet, with a 100-square-foot unit with a bathroom
costing anywhere from HK$4,000 ($516) to HK$5,000 ($645) per month.”).
65
See Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., LCQ21: Amendment of Plans and
Modification
of
Land
Leases
(May
5,
2021),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202105/05/P2021050500311.htm
[https://perma.cc/2SE3-GHEH].
66
Xianggang Jizhe Xiehui Gongzuo Fang (香港記者協會工作坊), Xinjie Xiang
Jiao Tudi Gaikuang ( 新界鄉郊土地概況) [Profile of the New Territories Rural
Lands], DEV. BUREAU, PLAN. DEP’T & LANDS DEP’T 18 (Nov. 18, 2017),
https://www.landsd.gov.hk/doc/en/smo/HKJA_20171118.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UQ2G-ZNQU]
67 See Press release, Gov’t of H.K., supra note 65.
68 See Jimmy Chow, Land-Use Conversions in Hong Kong to Make Areas Available
for Housing Developments Present Many Challenges, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 2,
2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/property/article/2012934/land-useconversions-present-many-challenges-process-making-areas-available
[https://perma.cc/XV58-S363] (“[L]and premium negotiations are typically a
lengthy back-and-forth process . . . .”).
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larger number of stakeholders have been participating in the plan
amendment process. Between 2009 and 2018, filings of public
comments have grown from 4,352 to 39,000, peaking at 115,000 in
2014. 69 This growth in public comment has imposed a mammoth
burden of the Board as it needs to consider each comment.70
The delay imposed by the plan amendment process, however, is
compounded by the even more serious delay created by
negotiations over the premium payment to the government
required by the lease modification. This premium is equal to the
difference between the value of land before and after the
modification.71 Premium assessments are centrally processed by the
Valuation Section of the Lands Department and are communicated
to the applicant by the District Lands Office by way of a binding
basic terms offer. 72 If applicants disagree with the premium
demanded by the Government, they may launch an appeal against
the premium to the Appeal team and seek further judicial review of
the Appeal team’s decision on procedural grounds. 73 The
government cannot compel the lessee-owner to accept the
government’s terms for lease modification, so the disagreement over

69
Liangtiao Xianlu Jiakuai Zaodi (Shang): Jiaqiaang Diqu Xietiao, Lishun
Gaihua Fenqi (兩條路線加快造地（上）：加強地區協調 理順改劃分歧) [Two
Routes to Speed Up Land Reclamation (Part 1): Strengthening Regional
Coordination and Straightening out Differences in Rezoning], BAUHINIA FOUND.
RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 18, 2020), https://paper.hket.com/article/2621063/理順改劃分歧
%20 加快造地紓樓荒 [https://perma.cc/N8LN-XV35].
70 See Chengshi Guihua Tiaoli (城市规划条例) [Town Planning Ordinance],
(2021) Cap. 131, 26, 36, §§ 6B(1), 6F(1) (H.K.); Plan Making, TOWN PLAN. BD.,
https://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/plan_making/participate.html
[https://perma.cc/YKZ9-B839] (“The Town Planning Board (TPB) will hold a
hearing to consider the representations and comments received. The persons who
have submitted representations or comments may attend the hearing and be heard
by the TPB.”).
71 See Land Disposal and Transaction: Premium/Rental Assessment, H.K. LANDS
DEP’T,
https://www.landsd.gov.hk/en/land-disposal-transaction/premiumrental-assessment.html [https://perma.cc/9ZTT-Q23B].
72 See Premium Assessment Procedure Relating to Lease Modification Transaction,
H.K. LANDS DEP’T, https://www.landsd.gov.hk/doc/en/practice-note/lpn/20061e_text.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH2W-C3NH].
73 See e.g., Gilbert Kwok & Adrian Tang, Hong Kong: Launching Arbitration for
Land
Premium
Disputes,
MONDAQ
(Dec.
15,
2014),
https://www.mondaq.com/hongkong/land-law-agriculture/359806/launchingarbitration-for-land-premium-disputes
[https://perma.cc/85LF-K92K]
(“[D]isagreement on fundamental issues such as lease interpretation (e.g.
interpretation of ‘industrial’ use) and government policies must be resolved by way
of civil proceedings in court.”).
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lease premiums may continue indefinitely without any conclusion
being reached.74
Both developers and the Hong Kong government have become
frustrated by the time and cost of going through the plan
amendment and lease modification process. Developers have
manifested such frustration by forgoing lease modification of their
own properties and instead bidding in the government’s auctions to
acquire entirely new leases. 75 The government has manifested its
frustration with various subtle schemes to speed up the negotiation
process.76 These schemes, however, have attracted little developer
interest as they do not break the gridlock of bargaining between the
government which controls the right to develop and developers
who control the actual land.
The government’s auctioning off completely new leases of
unleased land could, in theory, sidestep the obstacles posed by the
lease modification process. In practice, however, the government
does not have much land left for such auctions,77 whereas it controls
about 1,000 hectares of “village-type development land” for
generations of indigenous villagers’ future claims to their smallhouse rights.78
74 See Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., LCQ19: Pilot Scheme for Arbitration on
Land
Premium
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201811/07/P2018110700354p.htm
[https://perma.cc/S23C-7XXH].
75
Roger Nissim & John Corrigall, Land Supply – Why and How We Need to
Unlock the Private Sector’s Land Banks to Help Meet Current Housing Need, REAL EST.
DEV.
ASS’N
H.K.
¶
3
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.reda.hk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Lease-modifications-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4266-22D4].
76
See Information Note Relating to the “Pilot Scheme for Arbitration on Land
Premium”,
H.K.
LANDS
DEP’T
(2020),
https://www.landsd.gov.hk/doc/en/exc_mod/arbitration/Arbitration_Doc3.pd
f [https://perma.cc/5LRY-PPDJ]; Land Sharing Pilot Scheme and Guidance Note on
Applications,
H.K.
DEV.
BUREAU
¶¶
1,
3,
24
(2020),
https://www.devb.gov.hk/filemanager/en/content_1152/LSPS_GN_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L8A5-PRM3]; XINGZHENG HUIYI ( 行 政 會 議 ) [EXEC. COUNCIL
H.K.], DEB (PL-CR)1-55/127/1 TUDI GONGXIANG XIANDAO JIHUA (土地共享先導計
劃
)
[LAND
SHARING
PRIORITY
PLAN]
1,
https://www.devb.gov.hk/filemanager/tc/content_1152/LSPS_LegCo_Paper_c.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7633-Y5T7].
77 See Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., Transcript of Secretary for Development
Bureau’s
Media
Interview
(Dec.
17,
2014),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201412/17/P201412171139.htm
[https://perma.cc/VFW8-KL4R].
78
Staff Editor’s Office, supra note 59; see also Task Force on Land Supply, supra
note 54, ¶ 5 (“[T]here are about 700 ‘V’ zones with a total area of about 3,380 hectares
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The government has faced analogous obstacles in increasing the
permitted densities on the 3,380 hectares of village land held by
indigenous villagers or their associations. As noted above, the
villagers are eager to convert the land to higher-density residential
uses, but other Hong Kong residents are less enthusiastic: only 25%
of survey respondents who were not indigenous villagers supported
such conversion.79 Part of the reason for such reluctance might be a
popular sense that indigenous villagers already enjoy an unjust
windfall in the form of the government’s small house policy.80 This
policy not only discriminates against female villagers (because only
male villagers are entitled to a small house under the traditional
Qing Dynasty custom),81 but it also provides a housing windfall to a
small group of Hong Kong residents. Motivated by such concerns, a
citizen activist, Kwok Cheuk Kin, filed an unsuccessful lawsuit to
revoke the policy.82 Wary about being blamed for colluding with the
rich, the government has chosen the safest path by simply
maintaining the “small house” status quo. Although this status quo
sometimes involves clearly illegal transactions 83 of small house
rights involving powerful indigenous politicians and developers,
the government continues to insist, in the face of a serious housing
shortage, that all such buildings be no taller than three floors.84

(ha) mainly distributed across the 642 recognised villages . . . . As at [sic] October
2017, about 60 % of land on ‘V’ zones is under private ownership, while about 40%
are [sic] on government land.”).
79
Groups Advocate the Relaxation of the Building of Ten-Storey Small House,
supra note 60.
80 See, e.g., What Is Hong Kong’s Small-House Policy and Will Top Court Ruling
Affect Development?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 6, 2021, 10:24 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-andcrime/article/3155069/what-hong-kongs-small-house-policy-and-will-top-court
[https://perma.cc/PKQ3-QG5T].
81 See TASK FORCE ON LAND SUPPLY, supra note 54.
82 See Kwok Cheuk Kin, [2021] H.K.C.F.A. 38, ¶ 63 (“The appeal is dismissed.”).
83 See generally Wah Hing Strategy Co. v. Tang Wai Hung, [2014] H.K.C.F.I.
887 (presenting an example of a case involing an illegal development scheme).
84 See Wu Wanying (吳婉英), Jie 9,878 Zong Yisi Taoding Gean (揭 9,878 宗疑
似「套丁」個案) [Uncovering 9,878 Suspected Cases of Illegal Selling of Rights of
New Territories], Zhong Xinwen ( 眾 新 聞 ) [CITIZEN NEWS] (Jan. 5, 2018),
https://www.hkcnews.com/article/9241/ 套 丁 - 本 土 研 究 社 - 地 政 總 署 -9248/ 揭
9878 宗 疑 似 「 套 丁 」 個 案 - 佔 新 界 丁 屋 總 數 23- 本 土 研 究 社 批 政 府 視 若 無 睹 .
[https://perma.cc/FP5F-SB25]; see also TASK FORCE ON LAND SUPPLY, supra note 54.
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ii. Feeble Leviathan: The Failure of Land Resumption in Breaking the
Deadlock
The government, of course, need not rely on developers or
villagers to produce housing. At least in theory, the government
could simply acquire the land over the objections of its current
lessee-owners through the forced resumption of leases.85 The lesseeowners would be entitled to just compensation, but that price would
be objectively defined by courts that could, again in theory, sidestep
the endless haggling that has stalled lease modifications.86
The theoretical possibility of the government acting as an allpowerful Leviathan, however, has been largely a practical failure.
The reason seems to be fear on the part of judges and other officials
that the government attacking private property rights too
aggressively would ruin Hong Kong’s reputation as an enclave
protective of investors.87 The result has been a cautious and glacially
slow use of land resumption.88
The legal obstacles to quick and aggressive land resumption are
baked into the Hong Kong Basic Law and implementing ordinances.
Article 105 of the HK Basic Law obliges the Hong Kong government
to protect individuals’ and legal persons’ rights to property and
compensation for lawful deprivation of their property.89 Section 3 of
the Land Resumption Ordinance 90 (LRO) further authorizes the
Chief Executive to order land resumption only for a “public
purpose,” a term that both the government and the courts have

85 See Lands Resumption Ordinance, (1900) Cap. 124, § 3 (H.K.); Joyce Ng &
Olga Wong, Can the Lands Resumption Ordinance Offer a Way Out of Hong Kong’s
Housing Crisis and Quell Protests? S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 14, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kongeconomy/article/3027209/can-lands-resumption-ordinance-offer-way-out-hong
[https://perma.cc/8T5L-5CXR]. (“The law empowers the government to forcibly
take back private land . . . .”).
86 Id.
87
Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., LCQ5: Use of Lands Resumption Ordinance by
Government
(June
27,
2018),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201806/27/P2018062700628.htm
[https://perma.cc/E7JT-3F4R] (“Hong Kong, which, as a free economy, respects
the right of private ownership of property and allows the private market to play to
its strengths.”).
88 Id.
89
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 5, § 1 (H.K.).
90
Lands Resumption Ordinance, (1900) Cap. 124, § 3 (H.K.).
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construed narrowly to exclude private housing development. 91
While the government has exercised the resumption power
authorized under the LRO more than 160 times since the 1997
handover, these resumption cases have been painfully slow: five
land resumption for public housing cases in the past 10 years took
an average of 7.1 years from publication of the notice in the Gazette
until final completion of the project. 92 Moreover, the government
has been reluctant to use its resumption power outside a narrow
definition of “public purpose,” emphasizing that Hong Kong, “as a
free economy, respects the right of private ownership of property.” 93
Accordingly, the government has never used land resumption to
create purely private market-rate housing.94
The slow pace of land resumption has been reinforced by
litigation over the just compensation guaranteed by Section 6 of the
LRO. In theory, the compensation rules give the government
significant advantages. Director of Lands v. Yin Shuen Enterprises 95
held that Section 10 of the LRO, which bases the amount of
compensation on the loss or damage resulting from the resumption
of the lease, only provides for the value of land uses permitted by
the lessee’s deed, even when it is probable that the deed would be
modified by the government absent resumption. This doctrine
would theoretically permit the government to acquire land leased to
tycoons for agricultural or warehouse purposes at a much lower
value than the residential value that the government would earn by
resuming the lease and converting the land to residential high-rises.
Despite this theoretical capacity for the government to resume leases
with minimal compensation, however, there has been frequent and
time-consuming litigation over the compensable value of resumed
Id. § 2; Fok Lai Ying v. Governor Council, [1997] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 111;
How to Receive Compensation for Private Land Resumed in the New Territories by the
Government,
H.K.
LANDS
DEP’T (May
2006), https://www.landsd.gov.hk/doc/en/land-acq-clearance/landresumption-clearance/acq-compensation/reccomp_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65GD-RQRB].
92
« Shouhui Tudi Tiaoli » Shi Shenme? (《收回土地條例》是甚麼？) [What is
the “Land Resumption Ordinance”?], Xianggang Jingri Ribao (香港經濟日報) [H.K.
ECON.
TIMES]
(Oct.
3,
2019),
https://ps.hket.com/article/2461652
[https://perma.cc/6AVD-Y3VT].
93
Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., LCQ5: Use of Lands Resumption Ordinance
by
Government
(June
27,
2018),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201806/27/P2018062700628.htm
[https://perma.cc/E7JT-3F4R].
94 Id.
95
Dir. Lands v. Yin Shuen Enters., [2013] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 399 (C.F.A.).
91
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leases.96 For instance, in the case of Nam Chun Investment Co.,97 the
company, dissatisfied with the statutory compensation awarded in
1999, launched a series of appeals that were not resolved until 2007.
The expense and time required for lease resumption has led the
government to use it sparingly. Carrie Lam, then-Hong Kong Chief
Executive, advised the Legislative Council during a question-andanswer session that the LRO should not be invoked arbitrarily
because “owners whose private ownership is being infringed
upon. . . will apply for judicial review against the Government,”
with such lawsuits lasting as long as eight to nine years.98 The Wan
Chai Outline Zoning Plan (OZP), for example involved multiple
judicial review applications since 2011. With follow-up work still in
progress, the OZP has yet to be submitted to the Chief Executive in
Council for approval, impeding the development of various sites
within the district.99
iii. The Bias of Hong Kong’s Political Process for Locking in the
Status Quo
These failures of voluntary bargaining, land auctions, and lease
resumptions to produce housing naturally leads to the question:
What about political pressure from Hong Kongers suffering from
inadequate, over-crowded, and expensive housing? There has been
substantial political activism concerning housing over the last
quarter-century, but the activists have opposed rather than
supported the construction of new housing.100
96 See《Shouhui Tudi Tiaoli》Buchang Tudi Fazhan Qianli de Feihei Jibai (《
收回土地條例》補償—— 土地發展潛力的非黑即白) [Compensation under the
“Land Resumption Ordinance” – the Development Potential of Land is Either Black
or
White],
HONG
KONG
BAR
ASSOCIATION
(May
2015),
https://www.hkba.org/node/13844 [https://perma.cc/5P4B-WUHP] (“The issue
of the fair compensable value of the land-owners must be resolved by the courts
and the legal world.”).
97
Nam Chun Investment Co. v. Dir. Lands, [2005] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 480 (C.F.A.);
Nam Chun Investment Co. v. Dir. Lands, [2017] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 523 (C.F.A.).
98
Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., LCQ5: Use of Lands Resumption Ordinance
by
Government
(June
27,
2018),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201806/27/P2018062700628.htm
[https://perma.cc/E7JT-3F4R].
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., Cecilia Chu, The Myths and Politics of Housing in Hong Kong: The
Controversy Over the Demolition of the Hunghom Estate, 32 HABITAT INT’L 375, 375-83
(2008).
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The most dramatic example of such opposition was the defeat of
Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa’s “85,000 Plan” between 1997 and
2000.101 In his 1997 Policy Address, Tung Chee-hwa announced a
plan to build at least 85,000 flats a year in the public and private
sectors known as the “85,000 Plan.” 102 The proposal to enlarge
housing supply ran aground during the 1997 financial crisis in
which a bubble in housing prices that rapidly inflated after 1995,
suddenly burst, trapping hundreds of thousands of mortgage
buyers in negative equity.103 The collapse of housing prices in 1997
provoked substantial opposition from the Hong Kong real estate
industry and property owners to any proposal to reduce housing
prices by increasing supply. 104 The Hong Kong Institute of Real
Estate Administration, the professional body representing the real
estate sector, urged the government to reduce the housing supply to
boost property prices.105 Likewise, Thomas Kwok Ping-kwong, the
vice chairman of Sun Hung Kai Property, warned that bringing
85,000 new units onto the market could cause the bottom to drop out
of the housing market. 106 In June 2000, the Liberal Party, a proBeijing, pro-business political party, mobilized a substantial protest
(1,000 people) 107 in opposition to the 85,000 Policy, with the
101 See Gary Cheung, Why Ties Between Beijing and Hong Kong’s Property Bosses
Are
Unraveling,
INKSTONE
NEWS
(Sept.
25,
2019,
9:09
AM),
https://www.inkstonenews.com/politics/why-ties-between-beijing-and-hongkongs-property-bosses-are-unraveling/article/3030300 [https://perma.cc/HDY2JGF3].
102 See id.
103
Between the fourth quarter of 1995 and the third quarter of 1997, the
property price in Hong Kong recorded a 66% increase. See Victor Jing Li, Housing
Policies in Hong Kong, China and The People’s Republic of China 4 (Asian Dev. Bank
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
566,
2016),
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/183031/adbi-wp566.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/HVF5-CFVR]. Accordingly, the property price dropped
drastically by mid-2000 to around 50% of peak prices in October 1997. Id.
104 See, e.g., Wu Xiaobo (吴晓波), Xianggang Zenmele (香港怎么了) [What
Happened to Hong Kong], Wu Xiabou de Boke (晓波的博客) [BLOG OF WU XIAOBO]
(Mar.
21,
2021),
http://wuxiaobo.blog.caixin.com/archives/243818
[https://perma.cc/44X3-QZW7].
105 See Letter from H.K. Real Estate Administration to H.K. Housing Bureau
(June
15,
2000),
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr9900/chinese/panels/hg/papers/1-1900c01.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8BC-VPAQ].
106
YUEMAN-YEUNG (杨汝萬), ANJU LEYE ZHAN MINGTIAN (安居乐业展明天)
[BETTER HOUSING TOMORROW] 7, 18 (1998).
107
Zhongchan Nahan Fu Zichan (中產吶喊負資產) [Middle Class Protests of
Negative
Assets],
TELEVISION
BROADCAST
LTD.
(June
26,
2000),
http://ifiles.tvb.com/ifiles/20000626/f_more/20000626_445.html
[https://perma.cc/DX6C-6XZR].
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ostensible aim of protecting people’s assets. 108 By the summer of
2000, Tung Chee-hwa surrendered to this anti-housing campaign,
saying in a June 29th interview that the 85,000 Policy no longer
existed.109
The campaign against the 85,000 Plan was self-consciously a
narrowly self-interested effort by the real estate industry and
mortgage holders to boost land prices by restricting supply.110 Other
more public-spirited activists have not made promotion of higher
land prices their goal. They have instead aimed at protecting nonindigenous farmers from unjust dispossession 111 and preserving
county parks and historic landscapes and buildings. 112 Regardless
of their purpose, however, all these efforts have had the same effect:
they prevent the government from enlarging Hong Kong’s housing
supply, causing in turn a crisis of housing affordability.
The political strength of anti-development forces is powerfully
illustrated both by their vote-getting influence in Legislative Council
elections and their capacity to block the government’s development
initiatives. Eddie Chu Hoi-dick, the charismatic head of the Land
Justice League, won the legislative council election with 84,121 votes

108
Huiyi Guocheng Zhengshi Jilu (会议过程正式纪录) [Official Records of
Meeting], H.K. LEGIS. COUNCIL (July 12, 2002), https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0102/chinese/counmtg/hansard/cm0712ti-translate-c.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8SW7-98T8].
109
Ricardo Saludo, A Bit Too Much in Hong Kong, ASIAWEEK (July 5, 2000, 3:30
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/intelligence/2000/07/05/#lede2
[https://perma.cc/PB6E-5UCF].
110 See Press Release, Gov’t. of H.K., supra note 98.
111 See Olga Wong, Non-indigenous Villagers Lose Out in Compensation for Loss of
Their
Homes,
S.
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(July
7,
2014),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1548175/non-indigenousvillagers-lose-out-compensation-loss-their-homes [https://perma.cc/3A94-S65S];
Su Xinqi, No Eviction for Wang Chau Villagers Before Lunar New Year, but Further
Compensation Unlikely, Officials Say, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/community/article/2118664/noeviction-wang-chau-villagers-lunar-new-year-further [https://perma.cc/CR6YEQED].
112
Zhou Junren (周峻任), Dushi Jianshe Bentu Shenfen yu Shehui Yundong (
都巿建設、本土身份與社會運動) [Metropolis Construction, Local Identity and
Social Movement], 29 Lingnan Yanjiu (嶺南研究) [LINGAN STUD.], 2012, at 1, 6; Tanna
Chong & Gary Cheung, Protesters Storm Legco over Northeastern New Territories Plan,
S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 7, 2014), https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/article/1526945/protesters-storm-legco-over-northeastern-new-territoriesplan [https://perma.cc/SPT4-5MTH].
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in 2016, making him Hong Kong’s “King of the Vote.” 113 The
development-blocking power of anti-development groups is also
well-illustrated by the inability of the government to adjust the
boundaries of county parks to provide land for housing
development. Country parks cover roughly 40% of Hong Kong’s
total land area—more than ten times the total area occupied by any
sort of residential use.114 Efforts to convert any parkland to housing,
however, has been met with vociferous resistance from
environmental groups and neighbors abutting the parks. When the
South East New Territories Landfill (SENTL) proposed to use five
hectares of land in the Clear Water Bay (CWB) Country Park, for
instance, nearby Tseung Kwan O residents and district councils
fiercely objected, provoking the Legislative Council to “veto” the
proposal despite support from the Chief Executive. 115 Although
there was uncertainty over whether the Legislative Council actually
had the power to repeal an order of the Chief Executive, 116 the
government eventually backed down in the face of such vehement
and well-organized opposition.117
The inability of the government to overcome resistance to
development of existing land is highlighted by the government
preferring to reclaim entirely new land from the ocean despite the
gargantuan costs associated with such a quixotic plan. Carrie Lam’s
signature project, now apparently abandoned, was to reclaim 1,700
hectares of land from the ocean at a cost of 500 billion Hong Kong
dollars.118 Astonishingly, Lam favored this proposal, dubbed “the
113 See Kris Cheng, Interview: ‘King of Votes’ Eddie Chu Says It’s Time for a Real
Hong Kong Democratic Movement, H.K. FREE PRESS (Dec. 25, 2016, 12:01 AM),
https://hongkongfp.com/2016/12/25/interview-king-of-votes-eddie-chu-saysits-time-for-a-real-hong-kong-democratic-movement/ [https://perma.cc/T62CQW7R].
114 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text; Land Utilization in Hong Kong,
supra note 12.
115
Jolene Lin & Cheng Yan Ki Bonnie, An Analysis of the Tseung Kwan O
Landfill Controversy (Nov. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1711650
[https://perma.cc/K83F-S3TL]).
116
Gu Min Kang (顧敏康), Lun Xianggang Lifahui Dui Fushu Fagui de Foujue
Quan (論香港立法會對附屬法規的否决權) [On the Veto Power of the Hong Kong
Legislative Council over Subsidiary Legislation], 8 Yiguoliangzhi Yanjiu (一国两制
研究) [J. ONE COUNTRY TWO SYS. STUD.] 127, 129-30 (2011).
117
H.K. AUDIT COMM’N, PROTECTION OF COUNTRY PARKS AND SPECIAL AREAS ¶¶
3.7-3.8 3.38 (2013); see also Lin & Bonnie, supra note 115.
118 See Shirley Zhao & Sum Lok-kei, Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam Bulldozes
Ahead with Lantau Island Reclamation Idea . . . but at What Cost?, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (Oct. 21, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
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Lantau Tomorrow Vision” over the development of brownfield sites
and agricultural land.119
The government, in sum, is trapped between anti-development
activists, powerful developers, and indigenous landowners. The
government cannot let developers and indigenous landowners
develop their land for free without provoking the activists’ ire as an
apparently corrupt giveaway. But the government also cannot
induce the developers and indigenous landowners to pay a
premium that is acceptable to those activists. As for using its power
simply to take over the land using lease resumption, the government
is fearful of deterring investors with disrespect for private property
rights. Seeking land in which no interest group currently has any
stake, the government therefore pinned its hopes on a fantasy of
dredging up earth from the ocean. But “the Lantau Tomorrow
Vision” turned out to be all too literally described by its name: it was
nothing more than an effort to postpone for another day the
conundrum by proposing something that cannot be done within the
Chief Executive’s own term period.
III. DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM: HOW BILATERAL MONOPOLY AND
CONSTITUENCY EFFECTS TOGETHER BLOCK HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
Here, then, is the mystery in need of explanation. Everyone
agrees that Hong Kong faces a colossal crisis in its shortage of
affordable housing.120 Moreover, both the Hong Kong government
and the current lessee-owners of the land want to convert threestory small houses, fallow farmland, and warehouses and other
brownfield sites into high-density housing. Yet, somehow, neither
the negotiations between the lessee-owners and the government nor
the politics of Hong Kong will allow for that conversion. Instead,
Hong Kong is stuck with “agricultural” land that has never been
farmed, tiny rural homes that even their occupants think waste land,
kong/politics/article/2169535/hong-kong-leader-carrie-lam-bulldozes-aheadlantau-island [https://perma.cc/N74Q-B7MU].
119
See BENTU YANJIU SHE ( 本 土 研 究 社 ) [LIBER RESEARCH COMMUNITY],
HEZONGLIANGHENG: XINJIE ZONGTU FAZHAN QIANLI YANJIU (合棕連橫：新界棕土發
展潛力研究) [A STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF BROWNFIELD IN THE NEW
TERRITORIES],
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WpiXvM_k_6MtQAgQ6uSTkQgWgHd4OJ9/view [https://perma.cc/2GSZ-UV5K].
120 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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and an eyesore of parking lots, warehouses, and other brownfield
sites, which are manifestly less necessary than residential
apartments.
What has locked Hong Kong into such a perverse use of its
ample real estate? We argue in this section that Hong Kong’s
housing predicament is the foreseeable result of some dynamics
familiar from property theory. Because the government and lesseeowners negotiate over the zoning and leases of each parcel one at a
time, their negotiations are afflicted by bilateral monopoly that
encourages each side to misrepresent their actual valuation of
current and prospective uses. Calabresi and Melamed, in Property
Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, have
offered a lot of now-familiar solutions to the problem of bilateral
monopoly. 121 An impartial arbiter might, for instance, simply
enforce some sort of liability rule, forcing a sale at an objectively
determined price. 122 Those liability rules have gotten increasingly
exotic: scholars have concocted a dizzying number of fancy
mechanisms to force tight-lipped negotiators to reveal how much
they actually value an asset (e.g., call options, taxes, auctions).123 As
we explain in Section III.b below, however, all of these solutions
assume away the problem of property’s “constituency effects.” The
“constituency effects” of a law are the law’s promotion of a
politically effective constituency through the creation of a focal point
around which that constituency can rally. By creating a sense of
common entitlement, property law helps mobilize and organize
otherwise politically ineffective constituents to defend that legal
assignment. The result of this sense of entitlement is that the exotic
mechanisms of self-valuation, auctions, or objective appraisal of
assets’ values are, politically speaking, off the table.
Somehow the law must sidestep the power of existing
entitlement holders to protect their entitlements in the political
process by creating a new constituency capable of breaking the
gridlock that paralyzes negotiations over those entitlements. We
will offer one such possible solution in Part IV. In this Part, we
121
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1972).
122 Id. at 1092.
123 See Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149 (1996) (offering a summary of some of such
mechanisms); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1, 39-66 (2002) (offering an example of some exotic varieties of such
rules).
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merely lay out the gravity and pervasiveness of the problem created
by the interaction of bilateral monopolies and constituency effects
that protect such monopolies from political correction.
a.

The Problem of Bilateral Monopoly and Its Theoretical Solutions

Consider, first, how the endless haggling between the
government and lessee-owners follows the typical pattern of parties’
concealing their preferences because of a bilateral monopoly. The
government and lessee-owners are locked into such a “monopoly”
because there are no competing suppliers of the items (uses of
parcels, lease modifications) that each is buying or selling. If
villagers or real estate tycoons turn down the government’s offer of
a lease modification, there are no alternative buyers of lease
modifications to which the government can turn. Likewise, if the
government demands an extortionate premium to modify a lease,
then the lessee-owners cannot seek out another seller of lease
modifications who might offer a more reasonable price. Forced to
deal only with each other, each side has incentives to bargain
deceptively, dragging out negotiations interminably.124
The problem posed by lease modification in Hong Kong is
familiar from many other property settings. The assembly of land
through eminent domain, for instance, is the product of an identical
sort of strategic concealment of valuations. Sellers who know that
their parcel is essential for a larger project have incentives to
misrepresent the price that they will accept to sell to a land
assembler. Buyers who are assembling the land have an incentive to
misrepresent the benefits created by assembly in order to exclude
the seller from getting a share of those benefits. Because there are
not competing buyers and sellers who offer competing offer and

124
The problem of bilateral monopoly, a specific case of buying in a thin
market where efficient outcomes cannot be insured by purely voluntary bidding
between a seller and buyer, is described by Roger B. Myerson and Mark A.
Satterthwaite. See Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms
for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265, 265-68 (1983). Carol M. Rose has
characterized such bilateral monopoly as a special form of transaction cost blocking
Coasean bargains. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175,
2184 (1997) (calling them “Type II Transaction Costs” to distinguish them from the
costs of identifying the parties with a legally protected interest in property).
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asking prices, negotiations stall and sometimes breakdown
entirely.125
Just as the problem of strategic holdouts is familiar, there are lots
of familiar solutions to that problem, all of which limit, in one way
or another, the absolute power of one or the other side to demand
any price they please. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed
famously set the terms for all such solutions with the idea of a
“liability rule” under which one side could force a sale of the asset
at some objectively-determined price. 126 Eminent domain and
nuisance damages are two examples of such liability rules, but in the
half-century since Calabresi & Melamed’s seminal article, scholars
have proposed a profusion of exotic liability rules to force parties to
show their hand. The basic idea underlying all such solutions is that
some impartial arbiter will calculate the actual value of the asset to
one side, charging that value to the other side who will, by rejecting
or accepting it, honestly reveal that they value the asset more or less
than the other side does.127
The basic challenge of any liability rule, however exotic, is that
determining the actual value of an asset to a person is difficult. If the
price is set too high, then it functions just as an injunction, blocking
transactions that ought to occur; if the price is set too low, then it
forces transactions that ought to be blocked.128
Legal scholars and economists have proposed a variety of
cleverly designed liability rules to improve the accuracy of that
objectively-determined price. Ian Ayres and Jack Balkin, for
instance, laid out a theory of “higher-order liability rules” in which
an asset can be purchased by a party who matches the initial price
set by an impartial arbiter.129 That initial price, in effect, serves as the
starting price in an auction between two bidders whose bids
improve the accuracy of the initial award. For example, under Ayres
125
For an overview of this “holdout” problem, see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75 (1986)..
126
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 121, at 1092.
127 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 726–27 (1996) (offering a comprehensive
analysis of the theory that liability rules, by charging one party at an objectively
determined price, can force parties to reveal information about how much they
value an asset).
128 See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics
of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1104 (1980) (setting out this
basic challenge).
129
Ian Ayres & Jack M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 710-11, 748-49 (1996).
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and Balkin’s proposal, the condemnee who was forced to sell their
house to a land assembler for a judicially determined price (the
“initial price”) could buy back the right to preserve the house by
offering the assembler a higher price, and the assembler could
respond in turn with another yet higher price to reacquire the right
of assembly, in effect defining liability through an auction
mechanism. Economists and legal scholars have also enlisted
uncertainty about the consequences of a party’s valuation to
improve the valuation’s accuracy. Several such proposals rely on
some sort of shared ownership of an asset with an obligation to buy
each other’s share at some valuation reflecting both parties’
valuation. 130 Other scholars have suggested that making a selfdeclared valuation simultaneously the basis for property tax liability
as well as compensation in eminent domain would give owners
incentives to be honest in their self-valuation of assets because
owners who overstated the value of their property for tax purposes
would thereby risk losing their property for a low price if it were
condemned.131 Eric Posner and Glen Weyl have generalized from
such self-valuation to urge a “common ownership self-assessed tax”
(COST) in which owners are taxed on the value that they themselves
declare, with that value simultaneously constituting the tax base as

130
See Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, Dissolving a
Partnership Efficiently, 55 ECONOMETRICA 615 (1987) (suggesting a mechanism in
which each party would be obliged to purchase the other’s share at an average of
the two parties’ bids); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1073–80 (1995) (arguing
for, among other possible rules, a probabilistic division of assets, such that each
party is uncertain about whether they will be the buyer or seller at a price based on
each party’s self-valuation of the asset); see also Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston,
The Efficiency of Bargaining Under Divided Entitlements, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 273 (2014)
(offering an overview of division of an entitlement as a way to ensure accurate
revelation of preferences). But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules
Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221, 233 (1995)
(criticizing this proposal).
131
The idea of self-valuation by landowners for property taxation in which
the government would reserve the option of purchasing the landowner’s land at
the value declared by the owner was proposed by Sun Yat-sen in 1905 and later
implemented in Taiwan. See Emerson M. S. Niou & Guofu Tan, An Analysis of Dr.
Sun Yat-Sen’s Self-Assessment Scheme for Land Taxation,78 PUB. CHOICE 103 (1994). It
has been revived and refined by, among others, Saul Levmore and Lee Anne
Fennell. See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68
VA. L. REV. 771 (1982); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399,
1407 (2005) (providing an overview of such self-valuation systems, which she
characterizes as “customizable callable calls”).
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well as a price at which any buyer, not only the government, could
purchase the asset in a forced sale.132
Whatever the details of the particular scheme, all such proposals
share the idea that owners and buyers can be prodded into revealing
how much they truly value an asset so that it ends up in the hands
of the party who values it the most. It is easy, at least in theory, to
imagine applying one of these liability rules to the problem of
property gridlock in Hong Kong. Indeed, the Hong Kong
government’s system of lease resumptions is the most basic form of
liability rule: an impartial arbiter sets an objective price for the
lessee-owners’ lease, theoretically revealing that the government
values the resumption more than the lessee-owner’s value of the
lease. Following Ayres and Balkin, this simple liability rule might be
refined, for instance by giving the lessee-owners the right to buy
back their lease from the government through the offering of a
counter-price exceeding the court-defined price. Likewise, the
government might invite lessee-owners to declare how much their
lease is worth and then raise revenue by imposing a tax of some
percentage of that value. Or the government might use the “Texas
Shoot-Out” method of a divided entitlement under which the Hong
Kong government and lessee-owners would each offer their own
estimate of a fair premium for modifying leases to allow highdensity housing, and each side would thereby obtain the option to
force the other side either to pay the option holder the average of the
two premiums or to accept such payment in exchange for
surrendering such control.
And so forth. There is no shortage of policies that could
theoretically be used to nudge each side into revealing its true
valuation of Hong Kong land. So why have none of these clever
proposals ever been suggested, let along used, to break the Hong
Kong impasse on housing?
b.

The Problem of Constituency Effects: How Property Rights Create
a Sense of Entitlement that Blocks Political Change.

The reason, we argue below, is the constituency effect created by
property law. As a matter of practical politics, it would be
impossible to transform existing property rights with these
sophisticated liability rules because they would be regarded by one
132

POSNER & WEYL, supra note 6, at 21.
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or another politically powerful constituency as an unjust attack on
existing property rights. Put another way, existing property rights
have fostered a sense of entitlement among the politically organized
part of Hong Kong’s residents that foils such reconfiguration of
property law.
To better explain the obstacle posed by constituency effects, we
will first review in Section III.b.i how law more generally can create
focal points rooted in a sense of entitlement among the law’s
beneficiaries. We will then apply this literature in Section III.b.ii to
suggest how the sense of entitlement created by Hong Kong’s
existing system of property rights makes wholesale adoption of new
liability rules extremely unlikely.
i. How Property Law Can Entrench Itself Through Constituency
Effects
Laws create effective constituencies by uniting otherwise
unorganized individuals into interest groups with a common stake
in defending those laws. This unification of otherwise disorganized
individuals occurs through a variety of mechanisms. Simply by
singling out one characteristic of individuals as the legal basis for
some entitlement, the law can make those individuals identify as
members of a group defined by that characteristic. The Social
Security Act, for instance, made salient the characteristic of being
over the age of sixty-five because this age triggered eligibility for old
age insurance under the statute.133 A law might also create a sense
of entitlement by characterizing itself as a contract in which benefits
are provided in return for some action from the beneficiaries. Again,
the Social Security Act was self-consciously designed as such a
contract by linking payment of benefits to covered individuals’
paying payroll taxes while participating in the workforce.134 The law
might also inspire elite communication about benefits or direct
education to beneficiaries from governmental officials or procedural
mechanisms by which beneficiaries can overcome obstacles to

133
ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR POLITICAL
ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 36-38 (2003).
134
See Paul Romer, Preferences, Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement, in
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE,
AND LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 195, 195-200 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996).
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collective action, such as notices and hearings especially directed to
beneficiaries of the law.135
The legal status quo can also create an effective constituency
simply by defining a single focal point around which the
beneficiaries of that status quo can rally. Such focal points solve a
collective action problem created by a population with multidimensional preferences and, therefore, multiple possible majority
coalitions. 136 In such a population, citizens may waver between
numerous possible bundles of benefits without coalescing around
any single package. By picking out one such package on which
citizens can focus, the legal status quo enables a stable coalition to
form in defense of that status quo. 137 It helps, of course, that such
status quo is plausibly defended as morally “correct” according to
some widely accepted set of values. 138 There might, however, be
several such “correct” answers: The legal status quo helps people
overcome disagreement by picking out one such answer among
many as the legally privileged “correct” answer.
Land-use regulation can be a powerful creator of constituencies
through
all
these
mechanisms.
Landowners—especially
homeowners—often have large and undiversified investments in
real estate, the value of which is protected by regulations. 139 By
defining a specific set of protections against neighboring uses that
could lower property values, zoning regulations give neighbors a
common focal point around which they can rally to defend that
investment. By entitling persons living close to proposed rezonings
135 See generally Suzanne Mettler, “The Only Good Thing Was the G.I. Bill”: Effects
of the Education and Training Provisions on African-American Veterans Political
Participation, 19 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 31 (2005) (describing the GI Bill’s effect on
political participation); Jacqueline Chattopadhyay, Can Health Insurance Regulations
Generate Citizen Constituencies? 44 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 455, 462-63 (2019)
(describing how poor visibility of complex and obscure programs can be reduced
through elite communication).
136
Peter Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3 CONST. POL. ECON. 137, 148
(1991). The point has been frequently made in the legal literature since the 1990s,
especially to justify judicial review. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams,
Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial
Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723 (2009).
137
Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,
91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 261 (1997).
138 Id. at 251.
139
WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES 39-60 (2005).
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to posted notice in the neighborhood and to protest land-use
changes through a referendum, zoning laws further reenforce a
sense of solidarity among homeowners, converting them from a
random set of people into “neighborhood defenders” who dominate
zoning hearings. 140 The zoned status quo can also be plausibly
defended as a morally appropriate focal point around which
homeowners can rally because such owners can claim reliance on
existing zoning restrictions when they purchase their homes. Thus,
zoning is often regarded as a form of de facto property in political
discourse, regardless of what constitutional doctrine says.141
Constituency effects can make creative liability rules politically
impossible to enact. Consider, for example, Eric Posner and Glen
Weyl’s “common ownership self-assessed tax,” or “COST.” Their
COST would require owners of property to declare a value of such
property on the basis of which that property would not only be
taxed but also subject to forced sale by any buyer.142 The history of
American real property taxation, however, indicates that it is
politically impossible to enact any such tax. Out of deference to the
political influence of homeowners, virtually every state in the
United States has adopted a system of fractional assessment under
which residential real property is under-assessed relative to its
actual value. Judicial efforts to alter such favoritism towards
residential property have been handily rebuffed by legislatures
fearful of provoking anger from homeowners.143 Moreover, there is
140
Hills & Schleicher, supra note 25, at 108-10. The term “neighborhood
defenders” was coined and defined in KATHERINE EINSTEIN, MAXWELL PALMER &
DAVID GLICK, NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDERS (2019) (discussing how local institutions,
designed to enhance participation, actually empower an unrepresentative group of
residents to stop the construction of new housing).
141
Courts occasionally recognize the popular understanding of zoning as a
kind of contract in construing state statutes if not in enforcing formal constitutional
doctrine. See, e.g., Neighbors in Support of Appropriate Land Use v. Cnty. of
Tuolumne, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 882, 1009-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (characterizing zoning
as “similar in some respects to a contract” insofar as “each party foregoes rights to
use its land as it wishes in return for the assurance that the use of neighboring
property will be similarly restricted, the rationale being that such mutual restriction
can enhance total community welfare”).
142 See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 6, at 62-76.
143
For a description of the arbitrary discriminations produced by fractional
assessment in New York, see Alan Finder & Richard Levine, Unequal Burden: New
York’s Property Tax; Hodgepodge of Home Valuations Produces Disproportionate Taxes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
6,
1991),
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/06/nyregion/unequal-burden-new-york-sproperty-tax-hodgepodge-home-valuations-produces.html
[https://perma.cc/6EPE-V8U8].
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a durable psychological foundation for this political reality:
Americans tend to oppose taxation of non-realized capital gains.144
Posner and Weyl devote a few pages to speculations that people
might eventually adopt a sort of “optimal Buddhism” that would
eliminate their “fetishistic attachment” to property that causes them
to resist such forced sales.145 If the reform of property rules depends
on such a “Buddhist” change of heart, however, then it hardly seems
obvious why the change in property rules would be necessary in the
first place: Presumably these “optimal Buddhists” who have such a
relaxed attitude towards their possessions also would not
strategically exploit private information to outwit the people with
whom they bargain.
The same objections apply to other exotic forms of liability rules.
To the extent that they contradict a sense of entitlement created by
the existing property status quo, they will have no chance at being
enacted by any legislature. Forced sales at prices set by novel
auctions or liability rules, therefore, have only academic interest
unless those sales can somehow be made politically palatable by
side-stepping the constituency effects of the very property law that
these rules hope to change.
ii. The Constituency Effects of Hong Kong’s System of Property Law
Hong Kong’s system of property law has the hallmarks of selfentrenching constituency effects described above. The existing
stakeholders hold powerful positions in Hong Kong politics, and
they defend their stakes with entitlement-based rhetoric rooted in
promise and history. The track record of the Hong Kong
government’s failed effort to alter these entitlements when
confronted with such rhetoric suggests the futility of the sorts of
exotic liability rules that are standard fare for improving bargaining
over assets.
Consider how Hong Kong’s unsuccessful experience with land
resumption, the simplest liability rule, suggests the likely failure of
more sophisticated versions of forced sales. As described above in
Section II.c.ii, land resumption has been a failure because litigation
144
Zachary Liscow & Edward Fox, The Psychology of Taxing Capital Income:
Evidence from a Survey Experiment on the Realization Rule, J. PUB. ECON., Sept. 2022, at
1, 3.
145
POSNER & WEYL, supra note 6, at 79-80.
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over just compensation and public purpose has been too timeconsuming and expensive. Under existing law, leases cannot be
resumed by the government to produce private market-rate
housing, because such housing is deemed by courts not to be a
“public purpose” under the Land Resumption Ordinance.146 Even
for such public purposes, the government is obliged to pay
compensation that is the subject of apparently interminable
litigation. Of course, the Legislative Council or the National People’s
Congress might amend the Lease Resumption Ordinance or even
the Basic Law to modify these rules. The Hong Kong government
has, however, been extraordinarily reluctant to play hard ball with
lessee-owners, apparently out of deference to Hong Kong’s
reputation for having “a free economy” which “respects the right of
private ownership of property.” Behind this rhetoric is a sense that
land development companies sitting on thousands of acres of nowuseless land purchased at low prices nevertheless have a moral
expectation of a return on their investment that more aggressive
lease resumption would disrupt. Such worries might be framed in
terms of moral hazard: By resuming leases in defiance of those
developers’ expectations of eventual development, the government
would deter further investment in Hong Kong.
Whatever the economic merit of these worries, they are backed
by the powerful political influence of the lessee-owners. Developers
in particular are politically influential. Since the handover, tycoons
with large investments in real estate have in effect controlled about
a quarter of the appointments to the election committee that chooses
the territory’s top leader.147 So obvious is this power that a member
of the Legislative Council elected by one of the “functional
constituencies” that represent a specific business sector has even
expressed shame at his role, saying that “I’m a mercenary for the
rich.”148 Such votes may not be sufficient to dictate who is going to
be Hong Kong’s chief executive, but they are sufficient to embarrass
Beijing, which relies on a stable pro-Beijing coalition to govern. Key
See supra Section II.c.i.
China’s Communist Party Chips Away at Hong Kong Business Houses,
ECONOMIST
(May
22,
2021)
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/05/22/what-to-do-about-a-labourcrunch [https://perma.cc/RV72-928X].
148 China Is Not Just Shackling Hong Kong, It Is Remaking It, ECONOMIST (Mar. 18,
2021),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/03/20/china-is-not-justshackling-hong-kong-it-is-remaking-it?itm_source=parsely-api
[https://perma.cc/B6SJ-4UQ8].
146
147
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members of that coalition are developers and indigenous villagers.
Taking the 2012 Chief Executive Election as an example, the four
biggest developers and Heung Yee Kuk, which represent
indigenous villagers, backed Henry Tang, who won 390 nomination
tickets, much more than the 305 nominations won by Leung Chunying,149 who was backed by Beijing. Lee Ka Shing, the Chairman of
CK Holding Limited, said publicly that he supported Henry Tang
on the election day.150 Eventually, with Beijing’s coordination and
backing, Leung obtained 689 votes (65.62% of the total number of
votes), merely 88 votes higher than the election threshold, whereas
Tang obtained 285 votes (27.1% of the total number of electoral
vote).151
Like Hong Kong’s great land companies, the indigenous
villagers are armed with both powerful political rhetoric and
political influence against the liability rules that would force any sale
of their small house entitlement. As for rhetoric, they invoke a quasipromise made by the British to respect their traditional rights under
Qing law. Like the sense of entitlement felt by old age insurance
beneficiaries, this sense that their small house property is backed by
a promise mobilizes villagers to act with moral unity and purpose.152
That motivation is backed by a powerfully ensconced position in
Hong Kong politics. Indigenous villagers and their representatives
are an important base of the pro-Beijing governing coalition in Hong
Kong. 153 The Heung Yee Kuk, a statutory advisory body
representing villagers’ interests in the New Territories under Article
149
Wu Da Dichan Shang Qi Cheng Tang Chuzhan (5 大地產商 齊撑唐出戰)
[Five Major Real Estate Developers Support Tang’s Running in Election], H.K.
ECON. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2021), https://paper.hket.com/article/767077/5 大地產商
%20 齊撑唐出戰 [https://perma.cc/EZ5U-KMMJ].
150
Xuanwei Baitai Xian Yanliang (選委百態顯炎涼) [Election Committee at a
Glance], Dongfang Ribao ( 東 方 日 報 ) [ORIENTAL DAILY] (Mar. 26, 2012),
https://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20120326/00176_023.html.
[https://perma.cc/4P7Y-6JRR].
151
Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., Chief Executive Election Result (Mar. 25,
2012),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201203/25/P201203250290.htm
[https://perma.cc/T6AZ-YR3G].
152 See supra Section III.b.i.
153
Ng Kang-chung, The Heung Yee Kuk: How a Village Governing Body Became
an Empire of Rural Leaders, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 13, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/2018713/heung-yee-kukhow-village-governing-body-became-empire-rural-leaders
[https://perma.cc/2CRS-KM5W] (“After the handover, the kuk remained an
important pro-establishment political force, playing a key role in mobilising
villagers to support candidates from pro-Beijing political parties.”).
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40 of the Basic Law, is a powerful organization comprising heads of
rural committees. 154 The “Kuk” contributes one functional
constituency seat in the Hong Kong Legislative Council, one
member in the Executive Council, twenty-seven votes in the Election
Committee, and twenty-seven ex officio members in the District
Council. In addition, Heung Yee Kuk also has a good network with
the largest political parties in Hong Kong, Democratic Alliance for
the Betterment and Progress (DAB) of Hong Kong and Business and
Professional Alliance for Hong Kong, two bodies with powerful
blocs in the Legislative Council.155 The interconnection between the
“Kuk,” the DAB, and the New Territories Association of Societies
(NTAS), a pro-Beijing umbrella political group which consists of
hundreds of the New Territories community organizations, ensures
that the government will not lightly ignore indigenous interests.156
The power of existing law to create constituencies by defining a
single stable focal point for political activism can be seen in the
activism on behalf of the status quo. The Land Justice League has
successfully rallied Hong Kong residents to defend existing
landscapes and the current possessions of non-indigenous farmers,
but the League has not focused much effort on fighting for the
construction of new residential buildings. 157 One reason might be
that the existing historic buildings, scenic landscapes, or nonindigenous possessions all define a clear focal point around which
activists can organize. By contrast, prospective buildings, precisely
because they do not yet exist, cannot constitute a stable focal point
defining a unified constituency. People who currently pay too much
for rent to live in an overcrowded apartment unit have no reason to
support one possible residential building over another.
Unsurprisingly, because they lack any stake in a particular building,
they do not make the effort to march in support of a proposed
development in which they might never have any chance of living.
By contrast, Hong Kong residents rally in defense of existing county
parks’ boundaries because those residents know precisely how
154
Id.; Heung Yee Kuk Ordinance, (1959) Cap. 1097, §§ 2-4 (H.K.),
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap1097 [https://perma.cc/T9ZQ-KZSG].
155 See Councillor in DAB Wins Rural Power Vote, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
https://www.scmp.com/article/966716/councillor-dab-wins-rural-power-vote
[https://perma.cc/A8D5-ZP42]; Andrew Chun Kit Yu, Harmony and Discord:
Development of Political Parties and Social Fragmentation in Hong Kong, 1980-2017, 2
OPEN POL. SCI. 53, 53-63 (2019).
156
Yu, supra note 155.
157 See Chiu, supra note 63.
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those parks benefit their particular neighborhoods.158 Thus, Tseung
Kwan O residents will fight fiercely to defeat a small reduction in
the size of the nearby Clear Water Bay Country Park because the
park’s boundaries form a focal point that can coordinate their
resistance to change.159
Frontal assaults on existing property rights through novel
liability rules, therefore, are politically dead on arrival. However
academically clever such systems of forced sales might be for
promoting efficient transactions, they all ignore the political
influence created by those property rights in need of reform.
IV. USING LAND USE OPTIONS TO BREAK MONOPOLY BY CREATING
EFFECTIVE CONSTITUENCIES
Ending bilateral monopolies that are entrenched by constituency
effects is no easy task. We are mindful of what Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule call the “inside/outside fallacy.” 160 We have
diagnosed constituency effects as the problem “outside the system”
that is blocking the legislature’s enacting creative liability rules as a
solution to Hong Kong’s housing crisis. We cannot then turn around
to endorse some clever legislative solution that is likely to be blocked
by those selfsame constituency effects. Instead, we must somehow
devise a mechanism by which new constituencies can be created to
fight for new housing without encroaching on existing
constituencies’ defense of their existing entitlements. These new
constituencies also must somehow break the bilateral monopoly that
currently exists between lessee-owners and the government when
they bargain, parcel by parcel, over the lease modifications and
zoning of specific properties.161
In what follows, we will suggest that “land options for housing”
(LOHs) could meet these exacting standards as a practically feasible
reform. LOHs could sidestep the resistance of existing
constituencies because they allocate the vertical dimension of
development, an asset that is currently unallocated by the law, and,
See Cheng, supra note 113.
Lin & Cheng, supra note 115.
160 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1743 (2003).
161
For discussions on bilateral monopoly, see supra Section III.a. For literature
on bilateral monopoly, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 121, at 1089.
158
159
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therefore, is (to use a basketball metaphor) a “jump ball”—an asset
that is (literally) up for grabs.162 Moreover, because LOHs allocate
this dimension to a broad swathe of Hong Kong residents who are
currently sitting on the sidelines of the fights over housing, LOHs
have the potential to mobilize a new constituency. Finally, our
proposal ends bilateral monopoly by requiring existing parcel
owners to bid against each other to purchase LOHs from multiple
and competing LOH holders. Fostering such inter-parcel
competition admittedly is challenging because it requires the
government to identify multiple parcels as equally eligible for
development, letting the bids to purchase LOHs determine where
actual housing is ultimately built. Such a regime, however, produces
a benefit: LOH holders rather than the government itself would sell
these LOHs to developers and indigenous villagers who would
compete with each other to pay LOH holders in return for the right
to build high-density housing.163
Critically, our proposal leaves intact existing property rights of
lessee-owners. Unlike Posner’s and Weyl’s COST 164 or Ayres and
Balkin’s higher-order liability rules, 165 such competition does not
take anything away from existing stakeholders like developers or
indigenous villagers: These constituencies retain their brownfields
or fallow farmland untouched, but they gain an extra option that
they never before enjoyed—the option of buying air rights from
LOH holders for vertical residential construction. By avoiding such
a frontal assault on existing entitlements and instead allocating new
rights to new constituents, LOHs thereby avoid the constituency
effects that have foiled more direct efforts to change the current uses
of property.166

162
The existing legislative framework in Hong Kong does not have a clearly
defined transferable development right. Jun Hou, Dazhi Gu, Sina Shahab, & Edwin
Hon-wan Chan, Implementation Analysis of Transfer of Development Rights for
Conserving Privately Owned Built Heritage in Hong Kong: A Transactions Costs
Perspective, 51 GROWTH CHANGE 530, 531(2020).
163
See infra Section IV.b.i for further elaboration on the LOH mechanism.
164
POSNER & WEYL, supra note 6, at 79.
165
Ayers & Balkin, supra note 129, at 748-49; supra text accompanying note
129.
166 See supra Section III.b.ii on how the constituency effects of Hong Kong
Property law lead to land reform in stalemate.
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a. The Mechanics of Land Options for Housing
Before defending LOHs, we will outline their mechanics to
anchor that defense. In barebones summary, LOHs require lesseeowners of Crown Lands to purchase LOHs from LOH holders as a
necessary condition for building residential projects. The LOH
holders would bargain for either in-kind or monetary compensation
from the landowner in return for agreeing to sell their rights. In-kind
compensation would be units in the new project; monetary
compensation would be money equal in value to the square footage
that the LOH holder transfers to the landowner. As elaborated
below, these purchases of LOHs should be designed with a few
characteristics in mind to help solve the twin problems of bilateral
monopoly and constituency effects.167
i. Creation and Distribution of LOHs
The first step in any LOH program would be the government’s
definition of a total number of LOHs and distribution of these LOHs
among a set of holders. As a general matter, the government would
create enough LOHs to meet the projected housing needs for Hong
Kong’s residents over some fixed planning period. This calculation
would require an estimate of the number of new dwelling units
required to meet that housing need. The total number of LOHs
would be calculated as an overall percentage of this denominator,
estimated as a uniform percentage of a development’s floor area, the
purchase of which would entitle the developer of a project to build
the development.168
The distribution of LOHs among Hong Kong’s residents would
also reflect the government’s assessment of Hong Kong households’
167
For discussions on bilateral monopoly and constituency effects, see supra
Sections III.a and III.b, respectively.
168
The size of a building in Hong Kong is limited by the allowed plot ratio of
gross floor area. According to Building (Planning) Regulation, the gross floor area
of a building is defined as “the area contained within the external walls of the
building measured at each floor level. . . , together with the area of each balcony in
the building, which shall be calculated from the overall dimensions of the
balcony. . . and the thickness of the external walls of the building.” Building
(Planning)
Regulation,
(1956)
Cap.
123F,
§
23(3)(a)
(H.K.),
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap123F?xpid=ID_1438402647550_001
[https://perma.cc/R8KZ-CAQD].
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housing needs. Top priority, for instance, could be given to
households who have been on the waiting list for public housing for
the longest time or are the most “under-housed” in the sense of
occupying the most overcrowded or overpriced housing. The LOH
program could, however, also be designed to give influential Hong
Kongers a stake in future housing development, by giving away
some share of LOHs to middle-class as well as indigent Hong Kong
residents. The point would be to give to as many Hong Kong
residents as possible a stake in the future housing stock of Hong
Kong so as to create a constituency for housing.169
ii. LOHs as a Necessary and (Almost) Sufficient Condition for New
Residential Construction
LOHs serve as a certificate of pre-approval for residential
development. By “pre-approval,” we mean that the purchase of
LOHs would presumptively entitle the purchasers to build
residential housing in proportion to the LOHs that they purchased.
This presumption would be slightly qualified by a few ex ante and
ex post constraints. Specifically, that (1) the land would be part of
Hong Kong’s total inventory of buildable residential land; (2) the
purchaser would pay a per-unit fee, defined uniformly in advance
for every transaction, to cover the cost of necessary infrastructure;
and (3) the government would retain a very limited power to block
developments for urgent public necessity. We elaborate each of
these three conditions briefly below.
First, in advance of any LOH purchase, the government would
undertake a jurisdiction-wide planning process that would, in effect,
define Hong Kong’s total inventory of land suitable for high-density
residential housing. This inventory could be constrained by a few
obvious prohibitions knocking some parcels out of eligibility to
purchase LOHs. For example, the government could prohibit
construction in environmentally fragile areas and ban tall buildings
near the airport. We are confident, however, that these ex ante
constraints on residential construction would leave ample sites
available for new residential construction: As explained above in
Section II.a, Hong Kong has plentiful supplies of fallow farmland
and brownfields already occupied by warehouses, parking lots, and
169
See infra Section IV.b.ii for how LOH will create a new pro-housing
constituency.
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the like. Such sites are obviously not ecologically sensitive enough
to preclude crops or gas stations. There is no reason, therefore, why
their location or current use should preclude housing.170
Second, again as part of the process for setting up the LOH
system, the government would define a uniform per-unit fee to be
charged to every new residential development to cover the average
cost of infrastructure required by new housing. This fee would not
be negotiated parcel-by-parcel or tailored to specific buildings, but
instead would be based only on the government’s best estimate of
the total quantity of housing expected to be built using LOHs and
the total budget for infrastructure required by all new housing.
These projections, like any other sort of budgeting, would
necessarily be rough estimates. Shortfalls in fee-based revenue
would be covered from Hong Kong’s general revenues.171
Finally, the government would retain a limited power to block
developments after the lessee-owner purchases sufficient LOHs for
urgent public necessity. The reasons justifying such ex post
prohibitions would be stringent, resembling the sort of public
purpose needed under current doctrine to resume leases and
subject, as lease resumption currently is, to robust judicial review.172
Our LOH proposal thus reverses the burden of inertia now favoring
retention of brownfields and fallow farmland: Such inertia would
now favor the construction of new housing.
Once a developer presents a document establishing a proposed
project’s satisfaction of these minimum ex ante criteria, the proposed
development would be placed on an internet platform as an eligible
buyer of LOHs. Such listings would include an offer price for LOHs.
The price of the LOH would be required to be identical to the price
at which dwelling units in the proposed development would be
offered. Thus, LOH holders would receive exactly what housing
purchasers pay—either a dwelling unit or its equivalent price.
Assuming an ample supply of eligible land, lessee-owners would
thus bid against each other to purchase LOHs from the total supply
See supra Section II.a; supra notes 33-36.
The government of Hong Kong has huge fiscal surpluses for decades. The
five major sources of its general revenues are profits tax, land premium, stamp
duty, salaries tax, and investment income. Five Major Revenue Sources of the
Government,
FIN.
SERV.
&
TREASURY
BUREAU,
https://www.fstb.gov.hk/tb/en/business/general/five-major-revenue-sourcesof-the-government.htm [https://perma.cc/CBQ2-S6KM].
172
See Press Release, Govt’ of H.K., supra note 87 (indicating that the
government of Hong Kong always construes narrowly the definition of “public
purpose” in land resumption cases).
170
171
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conferred by the government on LOH holders. The offering price
would reflect the ratio of eligible land to total available LOHs: Too
many LOHs chasing too few parcels would cause LOH prices to fall,
while an abundance of parcels chasing a limited number of LOHs
would cause the price to increase.173
Once a developer acquired a sufficient number of LOHs to build
a particular project, then the trading platform would automatically
generate a certificate of pre-approval. The government would be
given a tight deadline—say, sixty days—by which to approve or
reject the pre-approved project. This review would not involve any
consideration of the purchase price paid for the LOHs. As noted
above, the criteria for disapproval would be urgent health and safety
considerations unforeseen through the general planning process
that defined the inventory of LOH-eligible land. The question of
how the premium from conversion should be divided between
lessee-owner and the public would be determined exclusively
through the process by which LOH purchases were negotiated. In
effect, the bargaining process between lessee-owner and LOH
holder would be the substitute for the public participation provided
by governmental negotiations.174
iii. Contingent (and Therefore Risky) Compensation for LOH
Holders
The lessee-owners’ obligation to pay LOH holders would be
triggered by the completion of a residential project. The amount of
compensation likewise could be keyed to the success of that project.
LOH holders, therefore, would bear some of the project’s risk. Those
who sell LOHs to unreliable developers, for instance, would bear the
risk that the project might go bankrupt because of cost overruns or
lack of market demand. In such a case, the LOH seller would not be
173
The general law of supply and demand determines the price of LOHs
because there exists a highly competitive market. See Merrill, supra note 125, at 7578 (arguing that market exchange is efficient in a thick market).
174
Under the Town Planning Ordinance, there are compulsory public
consultation procedures. In the process of plan-making, the Town Planning Board
will exhibit the relevant plans or amendments for two months for public
representations and publish and address public comments after the expiry of the
exhibition period. Town Planning Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 131, §§ 6, 6A, 6B (H.K.),
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap131!en-zh-HantHK?SEARCH_WITHIN_CAP_TXT=Within%20the%20period%20of%202%20mont
hs [https://perma.cc/6CFR-UJY9].
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paid until the project is eventually built by the foreclosing bank.
Likewise, if the initial project turns out to be less profitable than
anticipated, then the LOH holders, like any other unsecured
creditors, would receive less compensation (smaller units or less
money) than they initially expected. LOH holders’ sales of their
LOHs should, therefore, reflect an assessment of the project’s
viability. Once the sale is made, then the fortunes of LOH holders
and the developer who purchased those holders’ LOHs are bound
together by the ties of economic self-interest.
iv. Limited Alienability
LOHs would not be alienable prior to being sold to the lesseeowner of a particular parcel of land. Third-party speculators,
therefore, could not purchase “unattached” LOHs to resell to lesseeowners. After LOH holders sell their LOHs to a landowner for a
particular project, however, anyone can acquire the prospective
project (including the LOHs attached to that project) along with the
contingent obligation to pay the LOH holders. For instance, a bank
might foreclose on the project, including the LOHs that were
necessary for the project, if the initial developer ran out of money
and could not pay the construction loan. In such a case, the bank
would also acquire the obligation to pay the LOH holders if the
project were ever completed.
v. LOH Trading Platform
The government would be obliged to create an internet platform
on which LOHs can be traded similar to the Hong Kong Futures
Exchange. On this platform, everybody would be able to see in real
time all updates of supply, demand, and transactions, second by
second. Developers seeking to purchase LOHs would submit a
development proposal on the government’s LOH trading platform.
The proposal would include the location of the parcel to be
developed, its inclusion within the area of Hong Kong’s developable
land, the total number of dwelling units in the proposal, and the
total number of LOHs required to develop those units. The proposal
would propose a per-square-foot purchase price for the LOHs as
well as the dwelling units. To better inform prospective LOH sellers
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about the project’s likelihood of success, the proposal would include
a quality report disclosing the project’s financial feasibility,
estimated completion date, average duration of the last five projects
of the developer making the proposal, any regulatory concerns and
infrastructure fees and plans, and any social and environmental
impact of a proposed project that might result in ex post
governmental disapproval. The trading platform, which will be an
independent non-for-profit entity, can provide templates for
developers to prepare such quality reports. Both the estimated LOH
and unit prices and the quality report would be uploaded to the
trading platform and accessible to the public before any transaction
starts. LOH holders would evaluate competing proposals on the
platform, selling LOHs to those developers whose proposals seem
most likely to succeed.
b. The Justifications for Land Options for Housing: A Solution to
Bilateral Monopolies Entrenched by Constituency Effects
The LOH mechanism described above is presented as a solution
to bilateral monopolies and constituency effects that stymie housing
production not only in Hong Kong but throughout the world. We
have tried to set the bar high for success: As we argued in Part III, it
is not enough to either assume or ignore the existence of a
constituency capable of championing or thwarting a clever liability
rule or auction. Judged according to this stringent standard, how
does our proposal stack up?
As we explain in more detail below, LOHs not only break
bilateral monopolies in land but also do so without stepping on the
toes of existing entitlement holders. The key to breaking bilateral
monopolies is that lessee-owners of different parcels compete to buy
LOHs from LOH holders who are also competing for high-quality
projects in which to invest. The result of such competition is that
strategic holdouts lose opportunities to competitors who disclose
their true valuation. Unlike the liability rules, taxes, or auctions
urged by other scholars,175 however, this competition leaves intact
the property rights of the stakeholders, instead allocating an
unallocated asset—air rights—to a new constituency who thereby
gains not only property but also an incentive to lobby for more
housing.
175

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 121, at 1089.
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i. Fostering Inter-Parcel Competition to Break Bilateral Monopolies
in Land
The most obvious benefit of a LOH program is its elimination of
the bilateral monopoly now afflicting negotiations between the
government and lessee-owners. The LOH program pits multiple
parcel lessee-owners against multiple LOH holders, forcing each
side to moderate their demands to avoid being over—or under—bid
by competing buyers and sellers. The lessee-owner who insists on
offering a low price for LOHs will risk having a rival lessee-owners
outbid them, thereby losing the opportunity to build new and
profitable housing. In the extreme case, all available LOHs might be
sold to competing parcels if a lessee-owner stalls too long. LOH
holders also have an incentive to moderate their demands: Their
insistence on a top price for their LOHs could lead them to be underbid by competing LOH holders willing to take a lower price in
return for the chance to invest in high-quality development
proposals from reliable developers. Because the LOH holders are
bidding against each other, they lack the monopolistic position that
allows the government to hold out indefinitely for ever-greater
amounts of goodies (revenue, housing, plazas, parks, subway
improvements, etc.), exhausting developers’ patience and
revenue.176
Such valuation-disclosing competition is a product of the simple,
comprehensive planning required by our LOH Program outlined in
Section IV.a. By simultaneously classifying as many parcels as
possible as eligible for high-density residential uses, the government
avoids getting locked into negotiations with a single developer over
a single parcel. As one of us has argued elsewhere, although such
standardized rules have disadvantages, they avoid the thin market
that results from choosing a parcel first and only afterwards
176
During negotiation, a local government exercises its monopolistic power
to veto any unwanted developments. American local governments have
increasingly requested land developers to provide infrastructure and other
development costs. As such, developers protest against the imposition of growing
development costs. See Richard Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law,
21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 262-64 (2002); Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract
Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 605-06 (2010). For an
example of such failed negotiations between the government and a New York City
developer, consider the case of the Kingsbridge Armory. See Sam Dolnick, Voting
45-1, Council Rejects $310 Million Plan for Mall at Bronx Armory, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/nyregion/15armory.html
[https://perma.cc/A8H5-M25R].
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bargaining over development rights. 177 LOHs instead begin by
defining a general inventory of land and needed residential
development and then use competition between parcel owners and
LOH holders to determine the ultimate location of development. By
simplifying development approvals to create a thicker market,
LOHs are a species of property emphasizing standardization of
rights to reduce information costs and thereby enlarge the market
for real estate. 178
LOHs do not merely avert a bilateral monopoly but do so
through a kind of descending-price (or “Dutch”) auction that
maximizes speed. 179 Landowners who have a more pessimistic
estimation of Hong Kong’s future housing market can always hold
back to observe what LOH transactions reveal about other
landowners’ estimation of housing’s future. Because a LOH sale
never requires more than one bid, the LOH program also
emphasizes transactional speed. By requiring developers to propose
identical prices of housing units and LOHs prices in their quality
reports, the LOH program allows developers with a more optimistic
estimation of the future housing market to participate soonest,
creating a “rush effect” that pressures others to follow due to the
limited number of LOHs available on the market.
Hong Kong’s poor track record in moving parcels from patently
inappropriate uses to housing 180 suggests that these benefits of
Hills & Schleicher, supra note 5, at 120, 129-34.
See Henry E. Smith & Thomas W. Merrill, The Property/Contract Interface,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 777 (2001) (“[F]ree customization of property forms would
create an information-cost externality; mandatory standardization is the legal
system’s way of reducing these external costs to an acceptable level.”); Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 551
(2005) (“[T]he creation of idiosyncratic property rights increases the information
costs property imposes on third parties. Standardization, on the other hand,
reduces them.”).
179
On the theoretical advantages of auctions over individualized
negotiations, see generally Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Versus
Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (1996). For an analysis of the different properties
of “English” (ascending) and “Dutch” (descending) auctions, see generally Paul R.
Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50
ECONOMETRICA 180 (1982). For experimental evidence on how the Dutch auctions
maximize the speed of transactions and efficiency, see generally Elena Katok &
Anthony M. Kwasnica, Time Is Money: The Effect of Clock Speed on Seller’s Revenue in
Dutch Auctions, 11 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 344 (2008).
180 See, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson & Jin Wu, Tiny Apartments and Punishing
Work Hours: The Economic Roots of Hong Kong’s Protests, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/22/world/asia/hong-konghousing-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/JDR8-8BU6].
177
178
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speedy allocation of residential uses across parcels outweighs the
benefits of expert planners trying to determine impartially the ideal
location of housing. Hong Kong has tried that expert planning
approach for decades with nothing more to show than acres of
fallow farmland, small houses, and brownfields. 181 LOHs, by
contrast, allow LOH holders and lessee-owners to work out quickly
the details of how gains from conversion should be divided and
where new housing should be located. By evading the gridlock of
bilateral monopoly, that competitive process holds promise of outperforming the Hong Kong government’s past practice of parcel-byparcel negotiations.
ii. Creating a New Pro-Housing Constituency
Our proposed LOH program would be worth little if current
entitlement holders would likely block it from ever being enacted.
LOHs, however, hold the promise of harnessing, rather than being
defeated by, the constituency effects of property law. In particular,
LOHs (1) respect existing entitlements and thereby avoid being
defeated by current owners’ opposition and (2) create a new
constituency of LOH holders with the clout to lobby for new
housing.
First, consider how a LOH program sidesteps opposition from
existing entitlement holders that rival proposals invite. As explained
in Section III.a, the innovative approach proposed by Ian Ayres and
Jack Balkin, 182 Lee Anne Fennell, 183 and Posner & Weyl 184 all rearrange property in ways that directly assault current owners’ sense
of entitlement. LOHs, however, change no lessee-owners’ current
entitlements: Their rights to maintain and use small houses,
farmland, and brownfields do not include any right to build
residential high-rises. To the extent that villagers rest their
entitlement to small houses on Qing Dynasty property customs,185
See supra Section II.c.i.
See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 129; supra text accompanying note 129.
183 See Fennell, supra note 131, at 1407.
184 See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 6.
185
See Shirley Zhao, Controversial Small-House Policy Was Never Traditional
Right of Indigenous Male Villagers in Hong Kong, Landmark Hearing Told, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Dec. 3, 2018, 8:59 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/law-and-crime/article/2176204/controversial-small-house-policy-wasnever-traditional [https://perma.cc/AGH8-DQPL].
181
182
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for instance, that sense of entitlement does not include any
expectation to build higher than three stories.186 Turning this right
to the vertical dimension of land over to the permanent residents of
Hong Kong, therefore, should not trigger any sense of injustice that
would mobilize incumbent owner-lessees to resist the innovation. It
is revealing that innovative auctions have been used mostly to
allocate forms of property like radio spectrum, offshore wind rights,
or mineral rights on public land, where the property rights are
initially defined and held by the government free from incumbent
owners who might be motivated by a strong sense of entitlement to
block the auction process. 187 LOHs likewise allocate an asset, air
rights, that is undefined by any law and that no one currently is
entitled to exploit.
Second, consider how a LOH program can create new
expectations that will lead LOH holders to defend the development
of new housing. The idea that unallocated interests in land belong
to the state—the “Crown” in colonial terms—is deeply embedded in
Hong Kong’s history.188 This idea overlaps with the communist idea
that land is the common property of the people. 189 Hong Kong’s
commitment to capitalism qualifies this idea to the extent that
Crown lands have already been leased out. But air rights that have
not yet been allocated seem to belong to everyone equally under the
logic of Hong Kong’s preexisting system of property. Beijing has
long sought to create a constituency in Hong Kong that has a stake
in maintaining the system rather than challenging the regime. 190

186
The small house policy allows each indigenous male villager to build new
housing not more than 3 stories. Wuyu Shu (屋宇署) [Buildings Department], New
Territories
Exempted
Houses
(NTEH),
BLDGS.
DEP’T,
https://www.bd.gov.hk/en/safety-inspection/ubw/UBW-in-new-territoriesexempted-houses/index_ubw_nteh_intro.html [https://perma.cc/UD2Q-3DBQ]
(H.K.).
187
For a simple summary of Nobel Laureates Robert Wilson’s and Paul
Milgrom’s role in designing auctions for mineral rights and radio spectrum, see
generally Leandro Arozamena, Andrés Fioriti & Federico Weinschelbaum, From
Auction Theory to Market Design: Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson’s Contributions to
Economics, 38 ESTUDIOS ECONOMICOS 279 (2021) (Mex.).
188 See Chan & Wan, supra note 38.
189 See generally Shitong Qiao, The Evolution of Chinese Property Law: Stick by
Stick?, in PRIVATE LAW IN CHINA AND TAIWAN 182 (2016) (reviewing Chinese
property laws and policies over the past three decades as well as the meaning of
public land ownership under the current system).
190
See, e.g., Greg Torode & Marius Zaharia, What Is Love? Beijing Desires
Unconditional Loyalty from Hong Kong, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2021, 11:50 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-security-politics-
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There is no better way to accomplish this goal than by making the
majority of the residents holders of entitlement that will not be
fulfilled without stability or development. Although Beijing has
long relied on business groups, particularly developers, to govern
Hong Kong, Beijing elites have started reexamining this approach.191
Relying on the majority of permanent residents, rather than a
handful of tycoons, seems consistent with this new strategy.
Once the LOH program is up and running, LOH holders’
effectiveness as a property-defending constituency is likely
strengthened by their focused interests in specific development
projects. Homeowners with undiversified interests in a particular
building have greater incentives to defend that building’s value
through the political process than prospective buyers and renters
have in potential buildings. Because the value of LOHs is tied to
particular buildings in which LOH holders have invested their
LOHs, LOH holders have a similarly focused incentive to lobby on
behalf of development. If a proposed development fails, then those
LOH holders lose their entire investment. The political clout of the
LOH holders will help, therefore, with those necessary permissions
that remain even after a parcel is pre-approved for construction
because it has acquired sufficient LOHs.
LOH holders’ incentives to defend housing development
authorized by LOHs are further enhanced by the implicit promise
contained in a LOH program. As Paul Romer has noted, “people . . .
will be willing to incur a cost to punish someone who has made and
broken a promise.”192 The LOH program, once enacted, contains an
implicit promise to LOH holders that their selling LOHs to
otherwise eligible developers will result in the completion of a
building from which LOH holders will receive compensation in the
form of housing or money. For the government to renege on this
implicit promise “induces a taste for punishing the offender” from
the LOH holders. 193 The ad hoc negotiations between the
government and current lessee-owners, by contrast, do not create
any such sense of implicit promise because the specific terms under
explainer/what-is-love-beijing-desires-unconditional-loyalty-from-hong-kongidUSKBN2AR05L [https://perma.cc/UPX9-WVHU].
191 See Claire Jim & Farah Master, With Tighter Grip, Beijing Sends Message to
Hong Kong Tycoons: Fall in Line, REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2021, 4:25 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/with-tighter-grip-beijing-sendsmessage-hong-kong-tycoons-fall-line-2021-09-17 [https://perma.cc/4NL3-XK2Z].
192
Romer, supra note 134, at 199.
193 Id.
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which development will be permitted have not been defined in
advance. Although the government issues requests for proposals
(RFPs) to develop leased Crown lands to which tycoons respond by
offering some mix of amenities, revenue, and housing, the
government reserves the right not to accept any of the bids or even
to add conditions after a bid is accepted. 194 By contrast, the
government’s turning over the decision to accept a bid to LOH
holders makes it hard for the government to renege approval of the
housing project on which the landowner and LOH holder agree
because the existence of the program creates an implicit promise that
pre-approved projects will not be lightly blocked.
iii. What About Government Officials as an Interest Group?
The description of constituency effects above leaves out one
potentially enormous interest group: the Hong Kong or Chinese
governments themselves. Do governmental officials themselves
constitute a constituency that would fight to retain the land status
quo? As we shall explain in more detail below, LOHs have a feature
likely to be attractive to the Chinese Communist Party, which is the
practical ruling decision maker in Hong Kong: LOHs supply
information to the rulers about what Hong Kong’s residents want
without risking resistance to the Party’s rule that might emerge from
democratic elections.
Hong Kong’s semi-authoritarian system presents a special
challenge to land use scholarship that has typically assumed the
existence of a liberal democratic system in which politicians are
simply transmission belts for interest groups. Even Neil Komesar’s
account of land-use “dictators,” for instance, imagined that such
“dictators” would have no interests of their own but instead either
disinterestedly maximize the value of all real estate or, alternatively,
become the captive of the most influential interest groups. 195
194 See, e.g., Cheryl Arcibal, Hong Kong Government Rejects All Bids for Tuen Mun
Site, the First Land Sale to Carry Minimum Flat Size Requirement, S. CHINA MORNING
POST
(Apr
26,
2022,
9:44
PM),
https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3175605/hong-kong-governmentrejects-all-bids-tuen-mun-site-first-land-sale-carry
[https://perma.cc/WT4FBU4S].
195
Neil K. Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218, 219-21 (Burton A. Weisbrod,
Joel F. Handler & Neil K. Komesar eds., 1978).
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Likewise, the “growth machine” and “homevoter” models, the two
leading depictions of land-use politics in American land-use
scholarship, both take as their starting point elected politicians who
cater to interest groups. The “growth machine” model assumes
interests favoring construction like real estate brokers and building
trades unions,196 while the “homevoter hypothesis” imagines that
homeowners favoring maximization of home values rule the
roost. 197 But both imagine that the interests of the politicians
themselves merely reflect whichever group can best mobilize at the
polls.198
Hong Kong’s semi-authoritarian system defies traditional land
use models. Unlike those models, Hong Kong’s government
answers ultimately to the leadership of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). The CCP is undoubtedly an authoritarian system
capable of ignoring the interests of Hong Kong residents. The CCP,
however, still needs a mechanism to solve the “dictator’s dilemma”
of obtaining information about citizen’s preferences without
creating electoral threats to the dictator’s rule. 199 Without such
information, the CCP leadership could lose citizens’ willing
cooperation, incur productivity losses from quiet slowdowns, and
even suffer sudden flare-ups of rebellion from smouldering but
undetected resentments. The overwhelming defeat of CCP-backed
candidates in the 2019 district council elections made it clear to the
CCP’s leaders that their unaided guesses about public opinion were
not equal to the task of inferring what Hong Kong citizens really
wanted.200 Eliminating “unpatriotic” candidates from contention in
local elections might eliminate open resistance to the CCP, but such
crackdowns do not remedy the CCP’s lack of information about
196
JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLACE 155 (1987).
197
FISCHEL, supra note 139, at 18.
198
For overviews of the “growth machine” and “homevoter” models as rival
accounts of land-use politics, see Vicki Been, Josiah Madar & Simon McDonnell,
Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 230-34 (2014).
199
For an overview of dictators’ need for information-sharing from their
subjects and the dilemma that poses for rulers fearful of rebellion sparked by
citizens’ negative judgments of the regime, see generally B RUCE J. DICKSON, THE
DICTATOR’S DILEMMA: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL
(2016); RONALD WINTROBE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DICTATORSHIP (1998).
200
See Keith Bradsher, Austin Ramzy & Tiffany May, Hong Kong Election
Results Give Democracy Backers Big Win, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/world/asia/hong-kong-electionresults.html [https://perma.cc/SB4D-BGP5].
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local preferences or the potential embarrassment from popular
hostility manifested by low voter turnout.201
LOHs provide such a mechanism. Like housing purchases by
homebuyers in mainland China, LOHs enable LOH holders to
express their housing preferences with their sales of LOHs to the
developers of prospective projects.202 In both cases, those purchases
or sales are akin to “votes” insofar as they express the purchasers’
or sellers’ desire to live in, and the bear the default risk associated
with, a particular structure. Unlike votes for candidates, however,
those sales do not produce officeholders who might resist the CCP.
LOHs, therefore, can be expected to win CCP support insofar as they
provide information about citizens’ preferences at low political risk
to the CCP.
LOHs also serve the expressed interest of CCP leaders in
building more housing in Hong Kong as a means of building more
widespread popular support for the CCP. 203 CCP leaders have

201
On the exclusion of “unpatriotic” candidates from the 2021 elections, see
Kelly Ho, Beijing Approves Resolution to Overhaul Hong Kong’s Elections – Candidates
to
Be
Vetted,
H.K.
FREE PRESS (Mar.
15,
2021,
8:25
PM),
https://hongkongfp.com/2021/03/11/breaking-beijing-approves-resolution-toimpose-electoral-overhaul-on-hong-kong. [https://perma.cc/M3V8-Z4D2]. On
the CCP leaders’ worries about loss of prestige resulting from low voter turnout,
see Shibani Mahtani, The Opposition Is in Jail. Hong Kong Wants Its ‘Patriots’-Only
Vote to Look Legitimate, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2021, 12:13 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hong-kong-votedemocracy-jail/2021/12/17/fa4b2252-5bbf-11ec-b1ef-cb78be717f0e_story.html.
[https://perma.cc/K45A-DMA2]; Edmond Ng & Sara Cheng, Pro-Beijing ‘Patriots’
Sweep Hong Kong Election with Record Low Turnout, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2021, 5:46 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-patriots-only-electiondraws-record-low-turnout-2021-12-19 [https://perma.cc/LV5Y-BJX9].
202
On the ways in which a land market reveals the preferences of homebuyers
not only for structures but also local amenities and reliability of local government,
see generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao, Voice and Exit as Accountability
Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party?, 48
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158 (2017).
203
As Han Zheng, vice premier and a standing member of the politburo in
charge of Hong Kong affairs, has stated, the “Hong Kong housing problem must be
solved.” Zhou Wenmin (周文敏), Han Zheng: Xiang Gang De Zhu Fang Wen Ti Yao
Jie Jue (韩正：香港的住房问题要解决) [Han Zheng: Hong Kong’s Housing Problem
Must Be Solved], CAI XIN (Mar. 8, 2021, 5:40PM), https://topics.caixin.com/202103-08/101672514.html [https://perma.cc/QFZ9-APVF]. The director of the Central
Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong expressed the urgency of the CCP’s
commitment to increasing housing supply by visiting a poor public housing unit to
show Beijing’s concern about the Hong Kong housing problem. Luo Hui Ning Fang
Xiang Gang Long Wu Zhu Hu: Qin Yan Jian Dao Zhe Me Ji Po De Ju Zhu Tiao Jian
Xin Qing Shi Fen Chen Zhong (骆惠宁访香港笼屋住户：亲眼见到这么挤迫的居住
条件，心情十分沉重) [Luo Huining Visited Cage-House Residents: Seeing the
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acknowledged that the massive 2019 public protests triggered by the
Hong Kong government’s proposal of an extradition law were
manifestations of deep discontent with the Hong Kong government,
but they have attributed such discontent to material rather than
political deprivations—in particular, the high cost and scarcity of
housing.204 Whatever the balance of economic and political factors,
there is little doubt about the widespread dissatisfaction with
housing in Hong Kong.205 The CCP’s own account of the legitimate
sources of public anger, therefore, commits it to solving the housing
crisis. By unlocking land from the paralysis of gridlock, LOHs allow
the CCP to meet this commitment without embracing electoral
democracy that it deems threatening to the CCP’s rule.
Given the CCP’s likely posture, it is unlikely that Hong Kong
officials would have any self-interested reason to impede the
expansion of housing. Under the terms of the Basic Law, the Hong
Kong Chief Executive must negotiate among rival Hong Kong
groups represented among the various interests in the Election
Committee and Legislative Council. By creating a new constituency
of LOH holders to press for development, LOHs give the Hong
Kong officials the political cover necessary to accept development
proposals that might otherwise inspire popular resentment as
corrupt giveaways to established interests.
Apart from acting as the broker for local Hong Kong interests,
the Hong Kong leadership has an incentive to meet the CCP’s
expectations, because the CCP leadership ultimately controls
appointment to Hong Kong’s political offices. There is little doubt
that Hong Kong’s chief executives have all struggled to satisfy the
CCP leadership’s call for more housing with measures ranging from
revision of Hong Kong’s tenant protection law206 to the unveiling of
Crowded Living Condition is sorrowful], SOHU (Oct. 1, 2021, 7:42AM),
https://www.sohu.com/a/493109234_115479 [https://perma.cc/KK8T-5AVK].
204 See, e.g., Keith Zhai & Chun Han Wong, China Targets Hong Kong Wealth
Gap, Housing Woes After Political Purge, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2021, 9:07AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-targets-hong-kong-wealth-gap-housingwoes-after-political-purge-11615813651 [https://perma.cc/F4EV-CC3N].
205
Alexandra Stevenson & Jin Wu, Tiny Apartments and Punishing Work Hours:
The Economic Roots of Hong Kong’s Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/22/world/asia/hong-konghousing-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/T8HZ-F8C7].
206
Gigi Choy & Jack Tsang, Hong Kong Lawmakers Pass Tenancy Control Bill to
Protect Poorest from Landlord Exploitation, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 20, 2021, 7:29
PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kongeconomy/article/3153049/hong-kong-lawmakers-pass-tenancy-control-bill
[https://perma.cc/NWU6-ASXX].
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the 2021 North Metropolis plan’s proposed 350,000 additional
residential units.207 As explained in Section II.c.iii above, however,
these initiatives have yielded little fruit in the past and are unlikely
to break the land gridlock in the future.
One might understandably suspect that some ulterior motive
explains such persistent failure to follow through on proclaimed
commitments to create more housing. One such possible motive is
commonly termed “fiscal illusion”—the illusion allegedly suffered
by governmental officials that only programs that increase public
revenue are worthy of official effort.208 Fiscal illusion, however, is
not a law of nature: Assuming that it exists, it is contingent on
specific facts that would give governmental officials an incentive to
maximize revenue of the organization that employs them. 209 The
Hong Kong government might have such an incentive from the
revenues that they derive from lease modifications, revenues that it
would have to surrender to LOH holders under our proposal. That
revenue, however, is purely theoretical if gridlock prevents
rezoning and lease modification. Precisely because gridlock freezes
up the process of lease modification, the amount of revenue derived
from land premiums is surprisingly small. Based on numbers
provided on the Hong Kong government’s website, land premiums
contributes to 22.3% (2016-2017) to 26.6% (2017-2018) of Hong Kong
government revenue in the last 10 years. 210 Given that the Hong
Kong government has been repeatedly running budget surpluses

207
Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., CE Unveils Visionary Northern Metropolis
Plan
in
Policy
Address
(Oct.
6,
2021),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202110/06/P2021100600466.htm
[https://perma.cc/G9WN-3L3Z].
208
Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 572-73, 621 (1984) (explaining theory of “fiscal
illusion” and proffered solution of cost-internalization through compensation).
209
Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 353-56, 364-66, 373-75 (2000).
210
Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., Annex 2, LCQ8: Collection of Stamp Duties
and
Land
Premium
(Mar.
18,
2015),
https://gia.info.gov.hk/general/201503/18/P201503180592_0592_143561.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4H6K-ATJU]; Press Release, Gov’t of H.K., LCQ3: Revenues
from
Stamp
Duties
and
Land
Premiums
(Apr.
28,
2021),
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202104/28/P2021042700613.htm?fontSize
=1 [https://perma.cc/2GFN-R9RX]; Major Sources of Government Revenue, LEGIS.
COUNCIL SECRETARIAT (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.legco.gov.hk/researchpublications/english/1516fs04-major-sources-of-government-revenue-20160810e.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7RG-9DJT].
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and keeping a significant amount of fiscal reserve, 211 it would be
surprising that governmental officials would reject a solution to the
salient political crisis of housing for the sake of such paltry cash,
especially since they have publicly committed to spending many
times more to reclaim land from the ocean to solve that crisis.
The more likely explanation is not an obsession with revenue but
rather an inability to figure out an acceptable price. Hong Kong’s
leadership is vulnerable to accusations of “government-business
collusion” if they allow lease modification for an insufficiently high
price, but the prices that they demand are too high to win over
reluctant owner-lessees. Trapped without a price-revealing market,
everyone sits on their existing rights, maintaining a status quo
unsatisfactory to everyone. By using a market mechanism to set
prices of lease modification, LOHs remove this paralyzing blame
about “government-business collusion,” unlocking land for housing
that everyone wants.
Aside from the CCP leadership in Beijing and the Hong Kong
leadership in the Admiralty, the last set of officials who might
oppose LOHs is the Hong Kong planning bureaucracy. They might
argue that our trading mechanism jeopardizes the integrity of urban
planning, where “urban planning” is understood as a science that
urban planning bureaucrats apply to decide where to build and
what should be allowed. If city planning is understood as the expert
specification of where structures ought to be built, then we plead
guilty. We share the skepticism of critics ranging from Jane Jacobs
to Kenneth Kolson about the capacity of expert planners to meet the
informational demands required for the micromanagement of
complex systems like cities.212 Hong Kong’s track record illustrates
211
Twinnie Siu & Clare Jim, Hong Kong Plans Lower Budget Deficit as Economy
Expected
to
Recover,
REUTERS
(Feb.
24,
2021,
12:45
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-economy-budget/hong-kongplans-lower-budget-deficit-as-economy-expected-to-recover-idUSKBN2AO0GB
[https://perma.cc/2KBL-48AM] (stating that “Hong Kong usually runs balanced
budgets or surpluses, since its pegged currency system commits it to fiscal
prudence. Its fiscal reserves are expected at HK$902.7 billion at the end of March
2021 and fall to HK$775.8 billion by end-March 2026”).
212 See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 3 (1961)
(stating that “this book is an attack on current city planning and building”);
KENNETH L. KOLSON, BIG PLANS: THE ALLURE AND FOLLY OF URBAN DESIGN 187 (2002)
(summarizing the history of city planning disasters by noting that “our conception
of city planning, a vestige of baroque regimentation and display, has been
destructive of urban order”); MELVILLE C. BRANCH, CONTINUOUS CITY PLANNING:
INTEGRATING MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT AND CITY PLANNING (1981) (discussing the
tie between land use and municipal administration); John Rahenkamp, Land Use
Management: An Alternative to Controls, in FUTURE LAND USE 191, 191-92 (Robert W.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/5

2022

Land Options for Housing

221

the inadequacies of expert planning: Despite voluminous plans,
nothing gets built, and land sits idle as fallow farmland, warehouses,
and parking lots—uses that are obviously inappropriate by any
planning criteria.
As explained in Sections IV.a.1 and 5 above, the LOH system
requires both a comprehensive inventory of all parcels suitable for
residential development and a trading platform through which
LOHs are traded. Both of these tasks require planning expertise
provided by Hong Kong’s urban planning officials. These officials
not only would work closely with the Hong Kong Futures Exchange
to create and administer a new LOH trading platform but also
would provide guidance to developers preparing the quality reports
for individual development proposals. Urban planning officials
would also determine which parts of Hong Kong should be included
or excluded from the inventory of potentially buildable residential
land. This task of creating an inventory would indeed become more
expert-based insofar as it would be rooted in hard-edged baseline
rules about safety and environment rather than endless dickering
between different groups about the division of real estate value. To
the extent that planners have an open mind, both their skills and
self-interest suggest that they could support LOHs not only as a
better mechanism for creating housing but also a guarantee of job
security in which their skills will still be valued even as they play a
different type of planning role.213
V. BEYOND HONG KONG: LAND OPTIONS AS MOTIVATIONS FOR PROHOUSING CONSTITUENCIES ACROSS THE GLOBE
Housing shortages afflict cities across the globe. Can land
options like the LOH program be adapted to deal with such
shortages in places other than Hong Kong? As we explain in this
final Part, customized land options do not have any magical power
to break bilateral monopolies or promoting pro-housing
Burchell & David Listokin eds., 1975) (noting that “the best master planners we
have in the country inevitably are failures when it comes to prognosticating over a
long period of time”).
213
Hong Kong’s planners can learn a lesson from officials across the border in
the career benefits of such a change in roles. In the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese local
officials were competing with each other to sell locally controlled state-owned
enterprises (SoEs). See Yutao Huang, Solve the Problem or Escape the Responsibility?
The Politics of Chinese Privatization Reform, 4 CHINESE POL. SCI. REV. 1, 13 (2019).
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constituencies. In fact, land options superficially similar to our
proposed LOH program can actually exacerbate these problems or,
at least, do little to solve them. Hong Kong’s colonial land exchange
entitlement, for instance, did little beyond making Hong Kong’s real
estate tycoons even richer, because it did not break their land
monopoly. Likewise, Israel’s TAMA 38 program, while initially
promised as a way to increase housing supply, was foiled by its
failure to create a sufficiently powerful constituency to protect the
program from repeal.
Land options cannot break bilateral monopolies and create new
pro-housing constituencies unless they address three simple
propositions: (1) Bargaining frameworks in which a single (usually
local) government negotiates with a single land developer invite the
gridlock of bilateral monopoly in which each side conceals their
actual valuation of the land conversion; and (2) changing this
bargaining framework can be impeded by the constituency effects
of existing property entitlements; but (3) allocating new property
rights to third parties—in our proposal, LOH holders—can break
the gridlock by allowing new constituencies to bargain
competitively over the gains from land conversion. To illustrate
these principles, we will take a brief look below at some land option
failures as well some experiments with land options that hold more
promise for success.
a. Two Failed Land Option Systems in Colonial Hong Kong and Israel
Colonial Hong Kong and Israel have both created new forms of
property to stimulate housing production or renovation. Colonial
Hong Kong’s land-exchange entitlements, however, promoted
housing at an exorbitant cost by turning over enormous land rents
to the real estate tycoons who ended up purchasing those
entitlements. Viewed more abstractly, Colonial Hong Kong’s landexchange entitlements failed to solve the information-blocking
problem of bilateral monopoly. Israel’s TAMA 38 program, by
contrast, stimulated housing production without such a
maldistribution of land wealth, but it never created a constituency
effective enough to protect the program from the hostility of mayors
and neighbors.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/5

2022

Land Options for Housing

223

i. How Colonial Hong Kong’s Land-Exchange Entitlements Were
Thwarted by Bilateral Monopoly
Between the Communist takeover of mainland China in 1949
and the early 1960s, Hong Kong was deluged with over a million
refugees driven to the colony by famine and fear of persecution and
in need of housing. 214 To meet this new demand, the colonial
government of Hong Kong needed housing, and the natural location
for hundreds of thousands of necessary units was the mostly
agricultural New Territories. Lacking cash to compensate the
villagers who occupied this land, the government instead issued
New Territories land exchange entitlements, commonly known as
Letters A/B, between 1960 and 1983.215 Those Letters A/B were land
options entitling their holders to exchange their old land for new
land on which new residential structures could be built.
Accordingly, the exchange ratios for the letters varied depending on
whether the land taken by the government had been used for
residential as opposed to farming purposes: Letters A were issued
for residential land that could be exchanged for new land at a ratio
of 1:1, while Letters B were issued for farmland that could be
redeemed at a ratio of 2:5, reflecting its much lower value. 216 The
lower value of agricultural land was also reflected in the obligation
of Letter B holders to pay a lease premium equal to the difference, at
the time that the land was surrendered to the government, between
the value of the agricultural land that they surrendered compared to
the residential land that they received.217
This formula contained within it the seeds of an extraordinary
windfall for the compensated owner, because the land premium was
calculated based on the year that the old land was surrendered, not
the year in which the new land was acquired. If the new land
appreciated significantly between the time of surrender and the time
214 Million Refugees from China Crowd Housing in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (May
3, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/03/archives/million-refugeesfrom-china-crowd-housing-in-hong-kong.html [https://perma.cc/R6WG-SG6Z].
215
LIU RUNHE (劉潤和), XINJIE JIAN SHI (新界简史) [BRIEF HISTORY OF NEW
TERRITORIES] 94-103 (Sanlian Shudian (三聯書店) 1999).
216
Zheng Zhaoping (鄭釗平), Xiqu Huandi Jingyan Maixiang Siying (吸取換
地經驗邁向四贏) [Learning from Land Exchange Entitlements], Xinbao Caijing
Xinwen ( 信 報 財 經 新 聞 ) [XINBAO FIN. NEWS] (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://www.sdahk.com/symposium/120817.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TMD5AQ2V].
217 Id.
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that the new land was acquired, then the owner would have
received 100% of this appreciation. 218 Letters A/B thus became
profitable investment tools for those who could afford to wait to
acquire new land until the latter appreciated far higher than the land
premium charged by the government. For independent landowners
or small developers, the need for immediate cash led them either to
sell their Letters A/B on the secondary market or develop their new
land prematurely. 219 Developers with larger cash reserves, by
contrast, purchased the letters as investments, holding them until
the land appreciated far higher than the land premium demanded
by the government. 220 By 1980 the government had issued landexchange entitlements valued at more than 36 million square feet of
land.221 Lacking sufficient land with which to redeem these letters,
the government ended the policy in 1983, requiring in a 1984
ordinance that outstanding Letters A/B be redeemed with either
cash or land at 1984 market rates.222
Letters A/B thus contributed to the land oligopoly from which
Hong Kong still suffers. The value of those land-exchange
entitlements was far in excess of the loss incurred by the New
Territories’ lessee-owners, 223 and the form of this compensation
insured that most of those landowners would transfer the greater
share of this value to developers with the cash reserves to hold on to
the letters as an investment. In effect, the Hong Kong government
arbitrarily turned over an enormous appreciation in real estate value
to speculators for no better reason than its inability to more
accurately calculate compensation. While this exchange had the
advantage of eventually producing housing in the New Territories’
218
Dijia MaidiMofa – Huandi Quanyishu(低價買地魔法 — 換地權益書) [Land
Exchange Entitlements: The Magic of Purchasing Land at Low Prices], Jingji Yizhou
(經濟一週) [WKLY. ECON.] (June 14, 2013), https://www.edigest.hk/投資/低價買地
魔法-換地權益書-9978 [https://perma.cc/Y83L-HUS9].
219 Id.
220 Id.
221
Zhaoping, supra note 216.
222
New Territories Land Exchange Entitlements (Redemption) Ordinance,
(1997) Cap. 495, § 4 (H.K.) https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap495!zh-HantHK?xpid=ID_1438403271676_001&INDEX_CS=N
[https://perma.cc/8QEKVLSY]; Zhaoping, supra note 216.
223
The New Territories was leased to Britain for ninety-nine years from 1 July
1898, block Crown leases were granted for ninety-nine years to owners of land in
each block with titles derived from the Qing Emperor. , Land Tenure System in Hong
Kong,
LEGIS.
COUNCIL
(2016),
https://www.legco.gov.hk/researchpublications/english/essentials-1617ise07-land-tenure-system-in-hong-kong.htm
[https://perma.cc/39T8-PXR7] (H.K.).
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new towns, the policy did so at an exorbitant cost that deprived the
mass of Hong Kong citizens of any share of the wealth created by
real estate appreciation. In recent years, developers and scholars
have suggested readopting the land-exchange model to promote
development. 224 All such proposals, however, either allow
developers to monopolize future land rents as the old policy had
done, or they do not provide a clear mechanism for pricing land
bonds.225
ii. How Israel’s TAMA 38 Program Failed to Create a Pro-Housing
Constituency
In contrast with colonial Hong Kong’s land-exchange
entitlements, Israel’s TAMA 38 program was not initially aimed at
producing new housing. The program was instead an effort to
harness land values to renovate and strengthen buildings against
risk of earthquakes. 226 Enacted in 2005 as “National Outline Plan
Number 38” (“TAMA” being the Hebrew acronym), TAMA 38 gave
a new land option to the owners of old buildings defined as having
been constructed before 1980.227 On agreement by a super-majority
of such buildings’ owners, the owners could collectively sell air
rights over their building to developers in return for the developers’
strengthening the building’s earthquake resilience. The quantity of
air rights eligible for such sale varied during the life of the program,
224 See, e.g., Jiaru Woshi Teshou – Shenmeshi Yizhong Huandi Quanyishu? (假
如我是特首(3) - 什麼是乙種換地權益書?) [Suppose I Am the Chief Executive (3) –
What Is Letter B Land Exchange Entitlement Document?], H.K. LUXURY PORTAL
(Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.mls.hk/writing_manage/phk_tml/baab990e.html
[https://perma.cc/XK7C-YFVY]; You Dizhu Deng Shengzhi [Huandi Zheng]
Geng Xiyin (有地主等升值「換地證」更吸引) [Some Landowners Wait for Land
Exchange Documents to Increase in Value], WEN WEI PO (Oct. 6, 2021),
http://paper.wenweipo.com/2019/10/06/HK1910060035.htm
[https://perma.cc/GA5M-YSCZ]. One such proposal is the land bond solution
proposed by the Ronald Coase Centre for Property Rights Research at the
University of Hong Kong. See Ronald Coase Ctr. Prop. Rts. Rsch., Univ. H.K., Land
Bonds – A Tool for Large Scale Land Readjustment (2018) (unpublished proposal)
(available
at
https://www.hku.hk/f/upload/18177/Land_Bond_Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JEV7-Z5L8]).
225
For various proposals, see sources cited supra note 224.
226
For an overview of TAMA 38, see, for example, Zev Stub, As Israel Looks to
Solve Housing Crisis, Future of Tama 38 in Question, JERUSALEM POST (July 12, 2021,
5:58 PM), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/as-israel-looks-to-solve-housingcrisis-future-of-tama-38-in-question-673607 [https://perma.cc/BW7P-NVSC].
227 Id.
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ranging from a single story in 2005 to up to 3.5 stories by 2016.228
Likewise, the required super-majority of apartment owners within a
building required to authorize reconstruction or even total
demolition and rebuilding a structure ranged from 66-80%.
Abstracting away from such details, however, the general character
of TAMA 38 was a definition of a new property entitlement that was
given to existing apartment owners for sale to developers in
exchange for building improvement and enlargement.229
Because it distributed the new land option to a broad set of
stakeholders, TAMA 38 was vastly superior to colonial Hong Kong’s
land-exchange entitlement as a mechanism for producing housing
and distributing land wealth. Rather than having the government
arbitrarily concoct a price for land options like the ratios in Hong
Kong’s Letters A/B, TAMA 38 simply handed over the new
entitlement to a broad group of competing landowners, allowing the
land market to work out a distribution of the gains from
development between buyers and sellers. TAMA 38 also
discouraged speculative purchases by requiring the developers to
improve buildings and enlarge existing units by up to twenty-five
square meters each as a condition of their purchase.230 To cover the
cost of these improvements, developers immediately began adding
stories of housing rather than sit on their entitlement as a speculative
investment, as the Hong Kong developers did after acquiring landexchange entitlements. TAMA 38, in short, eliminated bilateral
monopoly between individual owners and the government by
turning over the land option to a competitive market for
development rights.
An unforeseen but beneficial side-effect of the TAMA 38
program was the creation of significant new housing in highdemand areas of Israel like Tel Aviv. Since at least 2011, Israel has
228
Moshe Shamai & Ravit Hananel, Urban Renewal or Earthquake Preparedness:
Lessons from Israel’s National Master Plan for Earthquake Preparedness (TAMA 38), 23
CITYSCAPE 381, 388-90 (2021).
229
For an analysis of TAMA 38 as a value recapture mechanism, see generally
Nir Mualam, Eyal Salinger & Sarah Goldberg, Implementing Value Capture in Israel:
An Examination of Recent Tools and Policies for Urban Renewal and Earthquake
Preparedness 1-3 (Lincoln Inst. Land Pol’y, Working Paper WP20NM1, 2021),
https://go.lincolninst.edu/mualam_wp20nm1-rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYH3V79W] (describing the TAMA 38 as a mechanism to achieve public goals of
protecting the citizenry from natural disasters through granting economically
beneficial building rights to private owners which incidentally results in more
structurally sound buildings).
230
Shamai & Hananel, supra note 228, at 388.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/5

2022

Land Options for Housing

227

suffered from an acute housing shortage that has only intensified in
recent years.231 This shortage has been exacerbated by Israel’s public
ownership of land. As in Hong Kong, the government—in the form
of the Israeli Land Authority (ILA)—owns 93% of Israel’s land,
leasing it out for long terms to private “owners” who technically are
merely lessees with leases up to ninety-eight years.232 As in Hong
Kong, the process by which the ILA issues and administers public
tenders of land is time-consuming and expensive.233 On top of the
ILA’s public tender process, municipalities also have regulatory
authority to block new development. By opening up between one to
3.5 extra stories above older buildings to residential development,
TAMA 38 promoted infill development in the areas where such
development had the greatest value. 234 The number of units thus
created was significant: Roughly one-third of all new housing
produced in Tel Aviv between 2018 and 2020 was produced through
TAMA 38.235
Despite these benefits, however, TAMA 38 has attracted
widespread opposition. Those extra stories of housing have
provoked complaints about excessive density and uncompensated
burdens on local services, especially from Israeli mayors who
resented TAMA 38’s bypassing their regulatory authority. 236
Because new housing created through TAMA 38 units is generally
built in high-demand areas, it tends to be expensive, leading to
complaints that such units drive up the price of other housing in the
same neighborhood.237 Having expired in October 2021, it is widely
231
On Israel’s housing shortage, see Ricky Ben-David, Israeli Housing Prices
Have Nearly Doubled in a Decade, with No Signs of Slowing, TIMES ISR. (Oct. 6, 2021,
6:30 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-housing-prices-have-nearlydoubled-in-a-decade-with-no-signs-of-slowing [https://perma.cc/2RKR-4HAN].
232
Elia Werczberger & Eliyahu Borukhov, The Israel Land Authority: Relic or
Necessity?, 16 LAND USE POL’Y 129, 129 (1999).
233
Ziv Rubin, Supply Side Constraints in the Israeli Housing Market—The Impact
of State Owned Land, 65 LAND USE POL’Y 266, 275 (2017).
234
Mualam et al., supra note 229.
235
John Myers, How Tel Aviv Boosted New Homes by Half – and What It Tells Us
About Fixing Housing, CAPX (June 25, 2021), https://capx.co/how-tel-aviv-boostednew-homes-by-half-and-what-it-tells-us-about-fixing-housing
[https://perma.cc/5CJ8-PKVJ].
236
Sara Toth Stub, A Controversial Urban Development Program Divides Israelis,
U.S. NEWS
(July 16, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/201907-16/israel-considers-ending-a-controversial-urban-development-program
[https://perma.cc/HR8Q-J4DR]; Shamai & Hananel, supra note 228, at 388.
237
Shamai & Hananel, supra note 228, at 388–90, 395.
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expected that TAMA 38 will be replaced by some alternative
program giving local governments more authority to control new
projects.238
Why is TAMA 38’s existence in peril despite its successes? The
complaints about density and gentrification seem weak. While extra
stories obviously increase density, there was nothing magically
appropriate about the status quo density before those stories were
added. The claim that increasing the supply of market-rate housing
raises housing prices contradict the overwhelming evidence that, far
from raising rents, extra market-rate housing absorbs demand that
would otherwise cause rents to rise even faster.239
Whatever the merits of TAMA 38’s pro-housing policies,
however, the program failed to create a constituency capable of
sustaining the program. Because it relies on the value of extra stories
to subsidize building renovation, TAMA 38 practically operates
only in areas where demand for housing is high. In such areas,
however, the share of pre-1980 housing stock is relatively low,
compared to other parts of Israel.240 TAMA 38, therefore, benefits a
small share of buildings in wealthy neighborhoods. It was entirely
predictable that the neighbors living in such areas would be likely
to resent the noise and density accompanying redevelopment of
buildings eligible for enlarged air rights under TAMA 38. TAMA 38
also limited the betterment tax that municipalities could impose on
new construction, thereby depriving the program of support from
municipal officials. Small wonder, then, that this land option is
vulnerable to political repeal.
b. Two Land Option Systems with Promise of Success
The lesson to be drawn from colonial Hong Kong and modern
Israel, then, is that land options help build housing only when they
substitute competitive market mechanisms for bilateral monopoly
238 See Ofer Petersburg, National Plan for Seismic Strengthening of Buildings Gets
New
Lease
on
Life,
ISR. HAYOM
(July
22,
2021,
2:01
PM),
https://www.israelhayom.com/2021/07/22/national-plan-for-seismicstrengthening-of-buildings-gets-new-lease-on-life
[https://perma.cc/YNQ9C62Q].
239
See SHANE PHILLIPS, MICHAEL MANVILLE & MICHAEL LENS, RESEARCH
ROUNDUP: THE EFFECT OF MARKET-RATE DEVELOPMENT ON NEIGHBORHOOD RENTS 4
(2021) (summarizing empirical research).
240
Mualam et al., supra note 229, at 75.
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while simultaneously creating a constituency that can protect the
land options from repeal. In designing land options, therefore, it is
prudent to keep both of these goals in mind.
To illustrate how land options might be designed to achieve
these twin goals, we turn to two land option programs that show
promise of promoting housing in a politically sustainable way:
transferable development rights and street- or block-level rezoning
(sometimes dubbed “hyper-local zoning”).
i. Transferable Development Rights: Building Coalitions with Air
Rights
Transferable development rights (TDRs) give owners of
properties where vertical construction above some minimum level
is barred by land-use restrictions the right to transfer their unused
air rights to other property owners. For instance, the owner of a
historically landmarked building might have the right to transfer
unused air rights to apartment buildings, located on another parcel,
allowing the owners of those buildings to build extra stories. In
theory, TDRs provide compensation to owners of heavily regulated
properties without requiring expenditure of public revenue. In
practice, TDRs are neither necessary nor sufficient for such
compensation and actually impose large hidden burdens on
taxpayers. Judged by their conventional justifications, therefore,
TDRs are failures. 241
As one of us has argued elsewhere, however, TDRs nevertheless
have political value because they can be used to enlist politically
influential constituencies to lobby on behalf of land deregulation
that might otherwise be impossible to enact.242 The effect of TDRs on
politics can, therefore, be positive to the extent that TDRs strengthen
constituencies or land use goals that local politics systematically
undercount.
Consider, for instance, how New York City increased residential
uses by allowing landmarked theaters to sell air rights to the owners
of apartment buildings. 243 Ordinarily, neighboring residents have
both incentives and political clout to defeat proposals to construct
241 See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 25, at 93-108 (explaining why TDRs are
failures).
242
Hills & Schleicher, supra note 25, at 112-17.
243 Id. at 125-27.
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higher buildings to accommodate more new residents: Their longterm interests in residential real estate create a constituency
sufficient to maintain existing zoning. Theaters, however, are a
politically popular cause in New York City. Actors and production
crews can be enlisted by TDRs to push successfully for higher
buildings over the objections of neighbors. 244 TDRs thereby can
build constituencies in favor of goals like housing that otherwise
might be slighted by the rival constituency effects of residential
zoning.
TDRs do not inevitably have the properties of creating effective
pro-housing constituencies. China’s practice of land tickets, which
looks similar to TDRs, demonstrates both that TDRs are appealing
to any government concerned about equitable development and
that, without empowering new constituencies, it is difficult to break
the old monopolies and the so-called new entitlements can be a
politically convenient excuse. Chinese local governments
monopolize the urban land market and the right to develop and
transfer rural land (through expropriation), which has resulted in
rapid urbanization, but also increasing rural-urban inequality. 245
Granting Chinese farmers TDRs, or land tickets, was supposed to
entitle those farmers to a certain portion of the increased land rents
brought by China’s rapid urbanization. 246 In reality, however,
Chinese farmers are not granted such rights; instead, local
governments use this proposal to reclaim farmers’ land and
generate land tickets which are then “sold” to the governmentaffiliated platforms by farmers who get compensation rather than
the market value of their lost development rights.247 The problem is
that, without empowering farmers who are the theoretical primary
beneficiaries of this policy, local governments have used this policy
to expropriate extra land from farmers, resulting in a reality
contradictory to the policy’s original intention.248
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ii. Street- and Building-Level Zoning: Hyperlocal Rights to Waive
Zoning
Another way to promote a constituency friendly to housing is to
delegate to current property owners themselves the power to waive
zoning restrictions on their own property. Dubbed “hyperlocal
zoning” by John Myers,249 such programs allow the residents of a
small area like a street or block to vote to allow all the properties
included within that area to intensify their current use. 250 Such
intensification might include, for instance, the neighbors’ voting to
permit accessory dwelling units or duplexes in a single-family zone.
Because homeowners would share equally in the value created by
such waivers, they would have incentives to support such a
program to realize the extra rental opportunities provided by more
residential options. TAMA 38 was indeed nothing more than such a
waiver program applied to individual apartment buildings. TAMA
38, however, was limited to a small share of buildings in cities like
Tel Aviv—those built before 1980. 251 By contrast, city-wide
hyperlocal zoning by street or block could build a city-wide
constituency because there are large numbers of politically
influential homeowners who stand to benefit from such waivers
throughout any city.
Hyper-local zoning could also theoretically break up bilateral
monopolies between governments and developers to the extent that
there are numerous roughly equivalent blocks within a single city,
or even neighborhood. To the extent that homebuyers regard city
blocks or individual street frontages as roughly fungible,
homeowners on those blocks or streets will have an incentive to take
249
John Myers, Hyperlocal Zoning: Enabling Growth by Block and by Street,
MANHATTAN INST.: URB. POL’Y SERIES 1, 5 (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.manhattaninstitute.org/hyperlocal-zoning-enabling-growth-block-and-street
[https://perma.cc/J9NS-JATE].
250
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actions to enhance their area’s comparative real estate values. If
“granny flats” are popular among buyers, then one street’s
legalization of such flats will put pressure on competing streets to
follow suit, to maximize the resale value of their home. Of course,
such decisions will balance resale value against current
consumption value: If neighbors really regard accessory dwelling
units as a recipe for excessive traffic or crowded sidewalks, then they
might decide to resist the market signals being issued by real estate
buyers’ brokers and their clients. Because tastes for more density
might vary among households, hyperlocal zoning might require a
super-majority to reduce risks of intra-street exploitation.
Hyperlocal zoning, however, provides only very limited
incentives for large-scale increases in density. It is one thing to allow
the space above a garage to be used as an accessory dwelling unit
because every house in the zoning district likely has a garage and
can share in the value created by that granular change in density.
Upzoning a street of detached single-family houses for multi-story
apartment buildings, however, would provide immediate benefits
only to a parcel that had some prospect of being redeveloped for an
apartment building. Unless there was some mechanism for sharing
the wealth generated by that redevelopment with the other owners
on the street, those owners would likely look askance at a proposal
for radically more dense zoning: What’s in it, after all, for them? One
could conceivably combine the powers to waive zoning rules with
some power to consolidate parcels, selling off all the parcels on the
entire block or street for a single project and distributing the gains
amongst the parcels’ owners.252 Unlike the modest zoning waivers
contemplated by scholars like Robert Ellickson, however, such a
radical empowerment of a single street or block has yet to be
proposed, let alone attempted.
CONCLUSION
Hong Kong’s housing is uniquely unaffordable, but its
predicament with land is anything but unique. Urban housing crises
exist wherever property rights create bilateral monopolies that
impede reallocation of land to housing. Those same rights also foster
252
For a proposal to replace eminent domain with Land Assembly Districts
that would give neighbors the power to sell an entire neighborhood, see Michael
Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1488 (2008).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/5

2022

Land Options for Housing

233

constituency effects that stymie efforts to break the gridlock by
rearranging property rights. One possible solution to both problems
is to confer new types of property rights on new classes of owners.
To the extent that those rights define entitlements in assets that
current owners cannot exploit, they evade constituency effects
because they do not interfere with current owners’ expectations. To
the extent that such rights can be embedded in a bargaining
framework where many buyers and sellers compete with each other
to purchase or sell that newly allocated asset, the rights also escape
the gridlock of bilateral monopoly.
We suggest land options for housing in Hong Kong as one
example of such a newly created right that can promote housing by
breaking apart old monopolies in property. There are, however,
many other types of land options that hold promise as ways to end
gridlock between owners and governments bargaining to change
current uses of land. Underlying all such ideas is a simple one:
Where property rights affect the political process, the solution to
gridlock-inducing property rights might be more and different
property that fosters economic and political competition.
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